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“PROCEDURAL SWIFT”: COMPLEX LITIGATION
REFORM, STATE TORT LAW, AND DEMOCRATIC
VALUES
JoEllen Lind*

I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, the judicial power of the federal courts is being
deployed to limit state tort law1 in violation of the spirit, if not the letter,
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.2 This phenomenon intersects vitally
with the phenomenon of complex litigation, for calls to address the
problems of complexity are being commandeered to reshape state
substantive law. The technique for achieving this result is to exploit the
power of the national government to regulate procedure in diversity
cases. Through recent legislation, amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), and judge-made procedural principles, the
federal courts offer an ever-more-enticing package of rules that can
conflict with state practice and produce profoundly different outcomes in
cases. Were these results neutral, they would not be so troublesome;
however, procedural differences in the federal courts typically
disadvantage plaintiffs, not defendants, and so provide an increasing
incentive for defendant forum shopping.
The growing hostility of the federal courts to plaintiffs’ tort claims
is old news to repeat defendants who have always found the national
*
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Copyright 2004, all rights
reserved. I wish to thank my colleagues Ivan Bodensteiner and Laura Gaston Dooley for their
comments and suggestions regarding this Article. I also wish to thank my research assistants
Joanne Kagler and Matthew Doherty for their assistance.
1. By the phrase “tort law,” I include not only the standard torts, such as negligence, but the
modern concepts of strict products liability and related topics.
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), by holding that there is
no federal general common law and that except in matters governed by the Constitution or
congressional legislation, the law to be applied by federal courts in diversity cases is the law of the
state).
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courts more congenial.3 However, with Congress’ recent efforts to
enlarge diversity jurisdiction through the Multiparty Multiforum
Jurisdiction Act4 of 2002 (sometimes referred to as the “MPMFJA”) and
the pending Class Action Fairness Act (sometimes referred to as the
“CAFA”),5 the invitation to enter the federal arena is overt. Now the
3. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class Action Update 2002: Mass Tort Trends, Choice of Law
Rule 23(f) Appeals, and Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, in Civil Practice and Litigation
Techniques in Federal and State Courts, SH009 ALI-ABA 1189, 1193 (2002) [hereinafter Cabraser
2002]. A recently published study by the Federal Judicial Center shows that defense attorneys have
a strong perception in class action cases that the federal forum is more beneficial to their clients’
interests and that they remove cases based on state law to the federal courts for that reason. See
Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Reports on the Impact of Anchem and
Ortiz on Choice of a Federal or State Forum in Class Action Litigation, A Report to the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules Regarding A Case-based Survey of Attorneys, 4- 5,7-8, 18, 29-31 (Federal
Judicial Center, April 2004) [hereinafter “FJC, Attorney Reports”], available at
http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_r=pages/556&url_l=index (last
visited May 12, 2004). Whether the defendant attorneys’ belief is justified is an open question. The
study indicates that the rate of class certification by state and federal judges for the sample involved
is virtually the same. However, the study also reported that federal judges were more than twice as
likely to deny class certification. Id. at 4, 8-9. This puzzling result is in part attributable to the fact
that in the majority of cases, state courts never reached the certification question. Id. at 34-36.
Other factors that make the study hard to assess are that it was based on attorney survey responses
and only 39% responded, and that comparative data were culled from cases that had been removed
to federal court and then remanded on the assumption that the removed-then-remanded cases were
not significantly different from the cases retained by the federal courts. For the study methodology,
see id. at 2, 8-9.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (West 2003) (providing that federal district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from
a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in an accident at a discrete location
under specified circumstances).
5. The proposed Class Action Fairness Act passed the House of Representatives in 2003.
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter CAFA, H.R.
1115]. The Senate version is still pending and is the subject of compromise. See Class Action
Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter CAFA, S. 274]. Since the late 1990s,
a number of bills have been introduced in Congress that can be broadly denominated as dealing with
class action fairness or jurisdiction. For instance, a bill entitled the “Interstate Class Action
Jurisdiction Act of 1999,” appeared in the House of Representatives in 1999. H.R. 1875, 106th
Cong. (1999). 1999 also saw the introduction of a bill in the Senate. Class Action Fairness Act of
1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999); see also 67 U.S.L.W. 2723 (June 8, 1999). Similarly in 2001,
H.R. 2341, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, appeared. See H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2001).
The Senate version was also the Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001).
H.R. 2341 passed the House in 2001. See 70 U.S.L.W. 2574 (March 19, 2002). The legislation
died in the Senate, as it never emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee. See 71 U.S.L.W.
2583 (March 18, 2003). The House of Representatives tried again in 2003 with the introduction of
CAFA, H.R. 1115, an act that was substantially similar to H.R. 2341. CAFA, H.R. 1115 passed the
House of Representatives on June 12, 2003. See 149 Cong. Rec. H5307 (daily ed. June 12, 2003).
CAFA, S. 274, the Senate version, then became the focal point of debate and compromise, because
unlike the previous year, the bill was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and passed out to
the full Senate for consideration. See 71 U.S.L.W. 2661 (April 22, 2003). Opposition to CAFA, S.
274, was strong and an attempt to invoke cloture to cut off debate was defeated by one vote. See 72
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national government intentionally uses its power to displace substantive
law historically reserved to the states, but indirectly. I dub this
phenomenon “Procedural Swift.” It is the strategy of creating federal tort
law through the guise of regulating procedure. Beyond its impact on
substantive law or even federal-state relations, the phenomenon of
Procedural Swift is most important for its corrosive effect on democratic
values. Defendants’ assertions that they are burdened by the American
litigation system should be considered seriously. But, when they pursue
remedies designed to mask the changes in law they seek, this creates
problems for democratic principles. It is one thing to search for
solutions to complex cases in a federal system; it is another to use
complex litigation to hide law reform that could not gain public approval
if its consequences were better known.
My discussion is made in the spirit of an essay and proceeds in four
major parts. Part II, Diversity Jurisdiction and Democracy, describes
the problematic connection between democratic values and diversity
jurisdiction.6 It explains that when Congress deploys minimal diversity
to make access to federal courts available in class action and mass tort
cases there are potential risks to the role of states in promoting the
democratic values of political participation, transparency, and
accountability.
Part III, Complex Litigation—The Rationale for
Intrusion relates these issues to the specific reforms in complex litigation
recently initiated by Congress.7 Part IV, Tilting the Playing Field,
shows how, once state-based cases are redirected to the federal forum by
this legislation, the procedural regime there can yield substantially
different results than state proceedings.8 The particular examples
analyzed are federal standards for class certification, federal standards
for summary judgment, and the development of federal “summary
judgment substitutes.” Together, they implicate a regime of “Procedural
Swift,” in which state tort law is being reshaped through the national
power to regulate procedure in diversity actions. Finally, Part V,
Diversity and Democracy Revisited concludes with the question whether
the rationale of a uniform procedure for the federal courts really supports
U.S.L.W. 2476 (February 17, 2004). In February 2004, S. 2062, the Class Action Fairness Act of
2004, was introduced in the Senate. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong.
(2004). Its jurisdictional provisions are substantially similar to CAFA, S. 274, insofar as the key
strategy is to rely on minimal diversity. For the moment, action on S. 2062 appears to have stalled.
See 150 Cong. Rec. S1014, S1191 (daily ed. February 11, 2004)(placing S. 2062 on the calendar);
see also 72 U.S.L.W. 2476 (February 17, 2004).
6. See infra notes 10-106 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 107-215 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 216-352 and accompanying text.
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the risks to democratic principles that it currently represents.9
II. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND DEMOCRACY
Federal diversity jurisdiction raises questions about democratic
values. To show this, I assume three hallmarks of a genuinely
democratic system that should be noncontroversial: access to political
participation, transparency in the process of lawmaking (whether by
legislators or judges), and lawmakers’ accountability to the people for
the consequences of their policy choices. Using procedure to affect
substantive law undermines all three.
First, procedural principles are technical and arcane; by their nature
they limit the information to people to make good decisions about the
policy issues that are at stake. This acts as a barrier to political
participation and impedes transparency. If a citizen cannot see the
probable consequences of a change in mere “housekeeping” rules,10
lawmaking becomes opaque, not transparent.
Secondly, many
procedural principles are applied by judges, and judges are not as
accountable to democratic majorities as are legislators. This can create
negative synergy. When it is difficult to predict the consequences of
procedural change and when either judges, legislators, or both might
initiate it, holding policymakers accountable is more unlikely. Finally,
judicial decisions are dispersed and not as concentrated as legislation, so
locating the focal points of policy shifts and overcoming coordination
problems to oppose them are challenging. Reorienting the locus of
procedural change from the states to the federal forum magnifies these
antidemocratic effects.
Obviously, procedural maneuvering at the national level takes place
one step removed from the political process of state lawmaking. The
democratic majority of any particular state has only a diluted effect on
ultimate results.11 When procedural innovation emanates from the
federal judiciary, accountability is a faint hope, for federal judges enjoy
lifetime tenure. Another problem is that one of the major sources of
federal procedure is particularly undemocratic, namely the process of

9. See infra notes 353-55 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Judith Resnick, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in
Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990) (emphasizing the misleading nature of the term
“housekeeping”).
11. This results from the composition of Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3 (providing
that the U.S. House of Representatives shall be composed of representatives from the several states,
selected by people from the several states).
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rulemaking established by the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”).12 Pursuant
to the REA, important modifications in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are initiated not by popularly elected legislators, but by an
elite group of specialists who make up the Advisory Committee.13 All
these phenomena are troublesome for the democratic values embodied in
the structural blueprint of the United States Constitution.
To link questions about diversity jurisdiction with claims about
democracy implicates federalism.14 This is complex, because the
constitutional boundaries of federalism have been changing as the
United States Supreme Court restricts Congress’ power to directly
legislate on substance. At the same time, debates over the normative
values and ideologies associated with federalism suggest a greater
willingness on the part of some academic commentators to promote the
role of the federal government.15 Many who explore the “New
Federalism” seek a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of
state/federal relations, particularly in the context of modern modes of
living where territorial boundaries seem less important and issues of
genuinely national concern never contemplated by the Founders arise.16
Nonetheless, it is useful to remember the democratic virtues that can
flow from conceiving states as prime instrumentalities of democracy on
a smaller scale. Akhil Amar has identified five different views of
federalism.17 Among them are the concepts that states provide political
safeguards of legal rights, associated with Herbert Wechsler and Justice
William Brennan;18 that states are more decentralized political entities

12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (providing that the Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe the general rules of practice and procedure for federal courts and that all laws in conflict
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect).
13. For a discussion of the rulemaking process pertinent to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in general, and the role of the Advisory Committee in particular, see Catherine T. Struve,
The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1099, 1103-12 (2000).
14. For instance, Martin H. Redish directly connects federalism to issues of political
legitimacy and democratic theory but from an institutionalist perspective that stresses separation of
powers. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretative
Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 766-67 (1989) [hereinafter
Redish]. One wonders whether his claim that Congress is more attentive to the claims of states than
the federal courts holds true today.
15. See, e.g., Symposium, Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competition and
Competence, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1996).
16. See Judith Resnick, Afterward: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 465, 485-503
(1996) [hereinafter Resnick, Federalism’s Options].
17. Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1229 (1994).
18. Id. at 1240-46.
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competing with the federal government, associated with Alexis de
Tocqueville and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor;19 and that states are
laboratories for social and political experiment, associated with Justice
Felix Frankfurter and Justice Louis Brandeis.20 None of these theories
alone constitutes a complete account of federalism, but all three contain
a common element—the positive effects of the states as core units of
government for citizen participation and the protection of citizen rights.
In this sense, they directly link the states with democratic norms through
the filter of federalism and it is this link that I will develop here.
Herbert Wechsler wrote that federalism calls for “government
responsiveness to the will of the full national constituency, without the
loss of responsiveness to lesser voices, reflecting smaller bodies of
opinion, in areas that constitute their own legitimate concern.”21 As the
states were invested with plenary power under the Constitution,
Wechsler argued that,
National action has thus always been regarded as exceptional in our
polity, an intrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather
than the ordinary case. This point of view cuts even deeper than the
concept of the central government as one of granted, limited
authority . . . . The political logic of federalism thus supports placing
the burden of persuasion on those urging national action.22

The states’ authority over most ground-level legal rights and duties
tracks without our intuitions that the rules of law that govern everyday
relations—how we make contracts, buy and sell property, whether we
are liable for harms we cause by accident or intentionally—should be
regulated at the communal echelon of social relations and in the
localities in which they occur. In the context of tort law, and
underscoring the role of states as providers of smaller scale democracy,
the fact that liability determinations are typically fixed by state juries,
who are more closely connected to events than are federal juries,
advances this role.23 But a cautionary note is needed here. Any account
19. Id. at 1236-40.
20. Id. at 1233-36.
21. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954).
22. Id. at 544-45.
23. This is because the geographic region from which the federal jury is selected is
significantly larger than a state jury pool. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000). For the effect that moving
to the federal forum has on the composition of juries in the criminal context, particularly as the
relevant political community is implicated, see Laura Gaston Dooley, The Dilution Effect:
Federalization, Fair Cross Sections, and the Concept of Community (forthcoming 2004, manuscript
on file with author).
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of democratic principles that focuses on state power must confront the
sordid reality that states’ rights have been used to facilitate
discrimination. In fact, it is in just this area of social relations that
federal power is most needed.24 But the wretched history of race, sex
and other forms of discrimination practiced by local state political
majorities does not mean that the ideal of democracy on a small scale is
in principle unjustified. In a healthy-functioning federal system, citizens
should have the opportunity to participate in policy decisions on a plane
close to them culturally, economically, and geographically—especially
on the question of the continued relevance of common law principles
determining their everyday relations. The primacy of localism and
community must be checked by the national power, for example, when
they become excuses for disadvantaging persons on the basis of suspect
classifications.25 Seen in this light, focusing on the states as the
repositories of tort law should not impinge on the federal government’s
essential role in insuring individual and civil rights. To hold otherwise
is tantamount to jettisoning the states as essential democratic units of
government in the American system altogether.
All these considerations should be related to Congress’ efforts to
enlarge the national judicial power using complex litigation as the
justification. What to do about complex litigation is not a neutral
question of modernizing procedure. Because a significant portion of
these cases—for instance class actions based on products liability—
depend on state law, problematizing complex litigation problematizes
the question of which sector of government, state or federal, has the
authority to resolve the policy questions that arise. As Deborah R.
Hensler notes, the empirical data regarding their worth is equivocal.26 It
follows that deciding whether state class actions are warranted is a
political judgment.27 Richard A. Nagareda’s work on opt-out in
settlements of damage class actions underscores this point.28 For him,
damage class actions are institutional rivals to lawmaking and ought to

24. See Resnick, Federalism’s Options, supra note 16, at 493-94.
25. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
26. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 466-67 (2000) [hereinafter HENSLER ET AL., DILEMMAS].
27. See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 204 (2001) [hereinafter
Hensler, Revisiting].
28. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of Class
Actions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda] (arguing in favor of the
development of a coherent explanation for the distinction between mandatory and opt-out classes in
order to arrive at a theory of the class action as a whole).
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occupy a role intermediate between public law and private litigation.29
For this reason, maintaining the individual’s right to opt-out of courtimposed class actions settlements must be preserved to limit the
monopoly power that might obtain to class counsel in the class action
context.30 Importantly, Nagareda connects this issue to the problems of
political accountability:
The preexistence principle [the notion that claimants have preexisting
rights that cannot be settled without their consent] stands as a brake
upon the tendency of the class action toward a kind of “central
planning,” a cautionary check upon the temptation characteristics of all
central planning schemes of governance to impose contested
enterprises of law reform in a manner insulated from political
accountability.31

If court-imposed settlements in class actions show central planning
features, procedurally based rationales for redirecting these actions to the
federal arena are more suspect on accountability grounds. These
phenomena connect to what Judith Resnick has described as the
“programmatic” federal judiciary,32 one in which the Judicial
Conference, outside the role of deciding cases, affects access to the
federal forum and finds itself conscripted by tort reform and other
groups to lobby Congress on legislation affecting their interests.33 But
this raises another point that must be uncovered and analyzed. It is the
implicit claim to “tit-for-tat” that lies behind tort reform efforts to
enlarge federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Clearly tort reform advocates feel sorely used by the states.34 In
that connection they decry what they take as illegitimate plaintiff forum
shopping to state, not federal, tribunals.35 Behind their complaints lies
the suppressed premise that all forum shopping should be treated equally
29. Id. at 153-58 (suggesting that one must understand what the class action device is and is
not before productive debate over its suitability as a vehicle for achieving external policy goals can
begin).
30. Id. at 162.
31. Id. at 196-97 (footnote omitted).
32. See Judith Resnick, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 296 (2003) [hereinafter Resnick, Constricting Remedies].
33. Id. at 297-298.
34. See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Facts About Tort Liability and its Impact on
Consumers, available at http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7366_Facts-Impact-On-Economy03.htm (last
visited Apr. 11, 2004).
35. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2003, S. REP.
NO. 108-123 § IV.B.4 (2003) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (observing that sometimes class counsel
will file similar class actions before different courts in an effort to find a receptive judge who will
rapidly certify a class).
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and that plaintiffs’ choice of state courts for their claims is properly
countered by defendants’ resort to the federal courts. But this approach
ignores the allocation of power to determine substantive law made in the
Constitution itself. The states are invested with plenary power over
everyday law. Thus, when state law creates substantive liability the
forum selection question is not neutral. The surface features of diversity
jurisdiction concede this. First, the traditional requirement of complete
diversity of citizenship makes it more, not less, difficult to elect the
federal forum.36 Even where diversity jurisdiction is possible, the Erie
doctrine stands for the principle that moving from the state to the federal
spheres is not supposed to yield a different outcome in terms of
substantive law. But, if this is the case, why do defendants so
vigorously agitate to open up the federal courts? Understanding this
requires understanding the trajectory of the tort reform movement over
the last decades and the potential for affecting substance through
procedure notwithstanding the intended limits of Erie.
A. The Pathways of Tort Reform
The most aggressive proponents of tort reform would simply
federalize state tort law,37 but they have not been able to achieve this
goal. There are a variety of reasons for this. The first, as might be
surmised from the preceding discussion, is the structural framework of
the Constitution itself. It allocates the power to make law between the
federal government and the states, and in so doing, instantiates the
American brand of federalism. The key feature of federalism is that it
retains the states as unavoidable components of government. Entities
that act on a national basis still must contend with the power of states to
promulgate laws that will govern their duties and liabilities. In fact, as
John S. Baker, Jr., has pointed out, national actors are reluctant to
acknowledge the implications of federalism:
Federalism itself promotes a certain “bias” against corporations and
businesses that operate interstate. As compared to a confederation,
federalism does facilitate trade; but compared to a unitary state,
federalism can present obstacles to the efficiency of trade. State laws
regularly raise transaction costs for corporations because the laws of
one state differ from the laws of other states. Indeed, when national

36. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806) (establishing the principle of complete
diversity).
37. See American Tort Reform Association, ATRA’s Agenda: Fair Laws, Fair Judges, Fair
Courts, available at http://www.atra.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
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corporations challenge particular state laws under the “dormant”
Commerce Clause, they claim a particular law “discriminates” either in
purpose or effect against or has too great an impact on interstate
commerce. Large interstate corporations tend not to favor federalism
because they think it reduces the size of their potential profit.38

Despite this reality, and according to the standard account, the federal
government was conceived as a government of limited, enumerated
powers.39 The division of lawmaking power found in Article I cabins
Congress’ ability to pass legislation to a list of specified topics of
particularly national interest.40 In contrast, the Tenth Amendment
declares that the “powers not delegated to the United States” are
“reserved to the States . . . or to the people.”41 While commentators
have disputed the ultimate range of Congress’ power to affect the
common law,42 when the Constitution was ratified, everyday relations
were generally governed by well-established principles of the common
law or tenets of equity inherited from the English legal system and
embodied in cases. Despite the controversy that raged between
Federalists and Republicans over the federal common law of crimes in
the era of the Alien and Sedition Acts,43 it is unlikely that the Framers
intended the common law of contracts, torts, domestic relations, and
38. See John S. Baker, Jr., Respecting a State’s Tort Law, While Confining Its Reach to that
State, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 698, 704 (2001) [hereinafter Baker] (footnotes omitted).
39. How powerful the new national government actually would be of course was the sticking
point in the Federalist/Antifederalist debate over the ratification of the Constitution. See JoEllen
Lind, Liberty, Community, and the Ninth Amendment, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.1259, 1293-96 (1993).
40. That is, laws to provide for the national defense, to establish bankruptcy and copyright
protection, and to regulate interstate commerce, among others. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Congress was also imbued with the power to establish the lower federal courts.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
42. For instance Stewart Jay makes this point:
Apart from cases in which Congress has conferred authority on courts to develop
substantive rules of decision, the modern Supreme Court has restricted federal common
law to ‘such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of
States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.’ Federal common law
is often referred to as ‘specialized.’ It is invoked as a ‘necessary expedient’ in a ‘few
and restricted’ instances. . . . In short, the difference between the ‘general’ jurisdiction
of state judiciaries and the ‘limited’ jurisdiction of federal courts lies in the conception of
the common law appropriate for the respective systems. . . . For federal courts, there is
yet another aspect of the matter, which is an apparent preference—shared by many in the
federal and state judiciaries—for maintaining power and responsibility at the state and
local levels. . . . [T]his federalism concern is partly inspired by the attitude that diffusion
of decisionmaking is more likely to promote democratic values.
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 (1985)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Jay].
43. Id. at 1014-19.
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typical crimes to be within the routine power of the federal courts.
Certainly, after the appearance of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins in 1938,
there has been little practical question that the states’ plenary power over
common law actions was final, subject to the protection of the Bill of
Rights,44 or the national government’s ability to make substantive law
through the Commerce Power.45
Given this structural barrier, the first attempts to realize the agenda
of tort reform were directed at states.46 Over more than two decades,
states have passed legislation capping noneconomic damages, restricting
the collateral source rule, revamping punitive damages, limiting medical
malpractice liability, shortening the statute of limitations for tort claims,
limiting attorneys’ fees in classes of cases, and instituting other
techniques to cure the alleged explosion of supposedly meritless cases
earning unjustifiably large verdicts from “runaway” juries.47 But
another reason why the proponents of tort reform have not been able to
redefine the law as they wish soon arose—legislative and judicial
opposition. While some states passed tort reform, others did not in the
face of stringent objections by consumers, trial lawyers, and other
groups. Even in states where new laws replaced old principles,48 these
44. Individual rights guarantees from the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment and trump contrary state law. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 482-86 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter
CHEMERINSKY] (tracing the evolution and current resolution of the incorporation debate).
45. Historic, demographic, and technologic changes such as the rise of the national
corporation, mass marketing, World War II, and even the Civil Rights Movement, all contributed to
a significant expansion of the commerce power. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(concluding that regulating the growing of winter wheat on a small farm for home consumption
comes within federal commerce power). Only in the last decade has the United States Supreme
Court tried to put the genie back into the bottle with a series of cases designed to reign in Congress’
prerogatives under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(holding that a federal statute, providing a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence,
exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because gender-motivated violence is not an
economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
115 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it an offense for an individual to
knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone, exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause authority
because possession of a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce).
46. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 170
(3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAYCOCK].
47. Hence the title of John Grisham’s book. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY
(1996). It its difficult not to lapse into the hyperbolic language of proponents of tort reform who
typically describe the state of American litigation in extreme terms. See, e.g., American Tort
Reform
Association,
Bringing
Justice
to
Judicial
Hellholes,
available
at
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
48. See LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 170. For a general history of the tort reform movement
that is highly critical of the phenomenon, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 3
LIND2.DOC

728

5/28/2004 11:35 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:717

could be taken away when the courts of a state struck reform legislation
as unconstitutional on state grounds.49 The inability to achieve tort
reform across the board as a bottom-up strategy became especially
significant with the rise of the nationwide state class action.50 This
meant that if even one holdout jurisdiction existed, it might become a
magnet for litigation with nationwide implications on a defendant’s
conduct.51 In fact, many states did not pass the complete package of
laws desired by proponents.52 In response to these phenomena and with
the changing fortunes of the national political parties, the tort reform
movement began to contemplate the power of the federal government as
a tool to impose its program on recalcitrant states.
In 1994, when it gained control of Congress, the Republican Party
introduced the “Contract With America.”53 This legislation would have
federalized significant areas of state tort law.54 Its focal points were the
proposed “Common Sense Products Liability Reform Act,” and the
“Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act.”55 Opposition was
immediate, public, and multifaceted. Moreover, President Clinton
vetoed the legislation that did pass and commentators expressed doubt as
to its constitutionality.56 Where did that leave the movement for reform?
If the states proved resistant to the tort reform agenda and if direct
federal assaults on state tort law were too difficult to achieve, what of
the federal judicial power, diversity jurisdiction, and the reality on the
Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 1 (2002).
49. See, e.g., Smith v. Dept. of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a Florida
statute capping non-economic damages violated Florida’s constitution because neither an
overpowering public necessity for abolishment nor an alternative method of redress was shown).
For a “map” of the status of state tort reform, see American Tort Reform Association’s, Civil Justice
Reforms, available at http://www.atra.org/states (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
50. Most commentators ascribe the increase in state class actions to the Supreme Court’s 1985
opinion in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), which held that minimum contacts
need not be shown between unnamed plaintiff class members and the forum state; opening the way
for state class actions with extra-territorial reach.
51. In fact, counties in Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas and other states have
been so characterized. See American Tort Reform Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial
Hellholes, available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes (last visited on Apr. 11, 2004).
52. See LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 170.
53. See Michael J. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue
Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 674-82 (1996).
54. Id. at 674.
55. See Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699, 70034 (1995). See also Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1433-34 nn.591-92 (2000).
56. See generally Patrick Hoopes, Note, Tort Reform in the Wake of United States v. Lopez,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 785 (1997).
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ground that procedural rules can profoundly impact substantive results?
B. The Federal Judicial Power, the Erie Doctrine, and Manipulating
Diversity
The “judicial power” of the federal government typically connotes
the landmark principle of judicial review, which was established by
Chief Justice Marshall’s celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison57 and
which secured the unique role of the United States Supreme Court in the
checks-and-balances scheme of the federal system.58 However, in
discussing the federal judicial power here, I mean to focus on its role
vis-à-vis the states in terms of the structural constitution.59 In this
context, it is key that Congress has the authority under Article I to
establish the lower federal courts.60 But, in keeping with the notion that
the federal government is one of limited power, Article III binds the
federal judiciary so that the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts
is restricted, not general.61 Consistent with this theme, Article III gives
federal courts original jurisdiction over federal questions—matters of
uniquely national concern, for they involve treaties, the federal
constitution, or congressional enactments made under Article I.62 Article
III also invested the federal courts with the power to hear claims based
on state law if they were between citizens from more than one state, or a
state and a foreign nation.63 This was the concept of “diversity”
jurisdiction that was deeply distrusted by the Antifederalists, who were
wary of the impact of a strong national government on local democratic
majorities.64
57. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
58. See generally William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1969) (examining the historical context of the decision and analyzing the opinion in terms of
various approaches that might have been used by Chief Justice Marshall).
59. The judicial power is established by Article III of the United States Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. III.
60. The only federal court that must exist according Article III is the United States Supreme
Court: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
other inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1. See also U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 9 (establishing Congress’ power to establish federal
courts inferior to the United States Supreme Court).
61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The Antifederalists were also deeply concerned about the impact on states from suits by
out-of-state creditors to enforce revolutionary debt. See Paul E. McGreal, Saving Article I from
Seminole Tribe: A View from the Federalist Papers, 55 SMU L. REV. 393, 399-402 (2002). See
also, Christina G. Heslinga, Note, The Founders Go On-Line: An Original Intent Solution to a
Jurisdictional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 247, 250-51 (2000). See generally Wythe
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In fact, whether the lower federal courts should exist at all was a
major point of contention during the Constitutional Convention.65 The
reasons the Framers adopted diversity jurisdiction are contested.66
Certainly diversity jurisdiction made it possible for state policies
expressed by local juries to be obviated by the device of placing a
controversy in the hands of a federal instrumentality.67 Alexander
Hamilton argued in the Federalist that the federal courts were needed,
among other reasons, because the independence of state court judges
from local influence was in doubt.68 Ironically, however, the first statute
creating the lower federal courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789,69 did not
invest them with general federal question jurisdiction, but only
authorized diversity jurisdiction. Perhaps in an attempt to mediate
between the concerns for local democratic majorities and problems of
national scope, the Judiciary Act of 178970 did require that the rules of
decision in diversity cases must be premised on “[t]he laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress shall otherwise provide.”71 However, the
statute’s general reference to “laws” left an ambiguity that was to prove
a major obstacle to federalism in the following century.
The period from 1789 up to 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated,72 witnessed an odd, even counterintuitive,
amalgam of principles governing federal courts. First, diversity actions
and proceedings generated by specialized federal statutes made up
federal cases until Congress granted a more general federal question

Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics and the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the
Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421; Jay, supra note 42, at 1012-13; Stewart Jay, Origins of
Federal Common Law, Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985).
65. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 35.
66. See Holt, supra note 64, at 1467-75.
67. Id.
68. See Michael G. Collins, Judicial Independence and the Scope of Art. III—A View from the
Federalist, 685-91 U. RICH. L. REV. (2004).
69. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (2000)) [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1789]. Federal questions were actually handled by state
courts; it was not until 1875 that general original federal question subject matter jurisdiction was
invested in the lower federal courts, save for a brief grant effectuated by the “Midnight Judges Act,”
the subject of Marbury, in 1801. See RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 221, 221 n.* (3d ed. 2001).
70. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14. See also Redish, supra note 14, at 762.
71. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000)).
72. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Weinstein]
(discussing the judicial and social change influenced by the passage and evolution of the Rules
Enabling Act).
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authority after the Civil War.73 Secondly, the procedural rules for the
federal courts were not national, but instead borrowed from states
pursuant to the Conformity Act.74 Thus, the technique of manipulating
procedural principles to indirectly control results in diversity cases was
not available. More important, it was not needed, for in the mid
nineteenth century, the federal courts took a direct route: they embarked
upon a project of developing federal common law to supplant the
common law of the states.
As we have seen, the Antifederalists worried that the judicial power
could provide the national government with a back door for intruding on
state prerogatives. Their concern proved well-founded75 when, in 1852,
federal courts began to erect a federal national law, usually one that
facilitated trade and economic interests.76 The decision that initiated the
regime was Swift v. Tyson.77 Swift created a topsy-turvy world in
diversity cases—federal, not state, substantive law was applied, but
state, not federal, procedure governed. During this era, plaintiffs and
defendants shopped to the federal forum whenever they could gain the
benefit of a different rule of law.78 Often, the parties who profited most
were repeat defendants, who sought the federal forum wherever
73. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
74. The regime was instituted by the Conformity Act, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17
Stat. 196, 197. It was not until Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in 1938, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2000), authorizing the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and instituting the modern
regime of federal rulemaking, that a uniform procedure in the federal courts became a normative
principle undergirded by the Constitution.
75. See Holt, supra note 64, at 1466-71.
76. See generally EDWARD PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1870-1958 (1992) (analyzing the litigation
process from the 1870s to the 1940s between individual plaintiffs and national corporations over
contract claims for insurance benefits and tort claims for personal injuries).
77. 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Swift, New
York’s common law rule that assignees of contracts are subject to the underlying claims and
defenses, including fraud, of one who seeks to avoid performance, was trumped by the emerging
federal commercial concept of “the holder-in-due-course,” an entity who could sue to enforce a note
immune from such defenses. Id. at 2-3. Premising its conclusions on a contested and now largely
discredited jurisprudential theory—that judges do not make law but merely find it—Justice Story
opined that the phrase “laws of the several states” from the Rules of Decision Act did not include
the common law. Id. at 4-6. Thus, with regard to issues of “general law,” and where no state statute
or constitutional provision applied, the federal courts were free to identify the general principles
themselves. Justice Story suggested that federal courts were just as competent, if not more
competent, in “finding” general law than state courts, and so could ignore state common law cases.
Id. at 8-12.
78. Probably the most extreme example, one regaled in the casebooks and Erie itself, is Black
& White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a party
disincorporated in one state and reincorporated in another just to gain the benefit of diversity
jurisdiction and the opportunity to rely on federal, not state, common law.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 3
LIND2.DOC

732

5/28/2004 11:35 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:717

possible. According to some commentators, Swift secured the federal
courts as “business courts” used by corporations to resist the claims of
workers seeking redress for injuries.79 In 1938, this topsy-turvy world
was reoriented by two monumental developments: the creation of the
Federal Rules of Procedure and the overruling of Swift by Justice
Brandeis’ historic decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.80
The rationale for uniform procedural rules seems obvious from our
contemporary vantage point. The idea of one body of rules that would
determine federal court practice regardless of jurisdiction is intuitively
appealing and produces obvious efficiencies. Moreover, having all the
federal rules emanate from one source and making them subject to a
regularized rulemaking process overseen by the United States Supreme
Court and Congress created an opportunity for a coordinated
modernization. One of the greatest achievements of the FRCP was the
merger of law and equity, so that litigants were no longer faced with the
risk of falling between two different court systems,81 as well as the
initiation of modern concepts of discovery82 and notice pleading.83 The
initial package of federal rules still provides the core principles of
litigation in the federal courts today. Erie appeared in the same year as
the FRCP and the relationship between the two would prove intricate
and problematic over time.
Understood at its most direct level, Erie overruled Swift for the
purpose of establishing that the national enterprise of making common
law through the federal courts was improper. Justice Brandeis’ words,
though often noted, bear repeating here:
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether
they be local in their nature or “general,” be they commercial law or
the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer
such a power on the federal courts.84

Despite this unmistakable message, its legal underpinnings have

79. See HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE
190 (2d ed. 1987). As Ann Woolhandler and Michael G. Collins describe it, federal courts
employed diversity jurisdiction after Swift particularly to protect contract and property rights in the
face of local majorities and in a way that was ineluctably tied to policing the jury. See Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 600 (2001).
80. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
84. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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been unclear and disputed.85 Yet, the gravitational pull of Erie is
decidedly constitutional, and its clear direction is that federal courts in
diversity are to constitute themselves as quasi-state tribunals, applying
the law of the state giving rise to the claims presented. Thus, federal
courts in diversity cases supposedly have to take state law as they find it,
for better or worse, subject to their ability to force state-based claims
within the form and mode of federal litigation. This simple prescription
did not last long, as the difficulty of discerning what is substance and
what is procedure soon arose.
To make a very long story short, by the decision in Guaranty Trust
v. York, 86 the Supreme Court introduced a test for determining how to
classify a conflict between state and federal law in a diversity action as
substantive or procedural—the test of outcome determination. But this
standard proved too much and exposed the FRCP to attack on Erie
grounds.87 After all, almost any FRCP might determine the outcome in a
case. Following York, an era of temporizing ensued in which the Court
attempted to avoid the problem by defining away apparent clashes
between state practice and the federal rules.88 In 1957, Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative89 introduced a balancing test to blunt
the impact of the outcome determination standard and reduced the need
for legal fictions.90 But, as with all balancing tests, Byrd could not
insure the immunity of the FRCP to Erie attack under all circumstances.
Finally with its opinion in Hanna v. Plumer91 the Court introduced a new
analytical framework for assessing the status of a federal rule that
conflicts with a state practice in a diversity case.
For the Hanna court, the FRCP (and federal procedural statutes) do
85. On one level, the decision could simply be premised on the idea that Swift misread the
Rules of Decision Act and erroneously excluded common law from the “laws” of the states. If it did
not, this is in tension with the opinion of some that diversity jurisdiction itself might have been
used to confer a power on the federal courts to craft a national law designed to remove bias against
out-of-staters. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 701-02
(1974) [hereinafter Ely, Myth]; Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1985).
86. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
87. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
88. See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchts. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (holding
that FRCP 3 does not apply to determine tolling of statute of limitations for state-based claims);
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (deciding what law should apply when
corporation fails to register to do business in a state); Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949) (holding the FRCP 23.1 bond requirement inapplicable to state-based derivative
action).
89. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
90. Id. at 537-39.
91. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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not implicate Erie at all, as they trace their pedigree to a different origin
than federal judge-made rules, i.e., in the case of the FRCP, to the Rules
Enabling Act.92 In turn, the REA traces to a proper exercise of one of
Congress’ powers enumerated in Article I—the power to establish the
inferior federal courts. And, the need for a uniform procedure to run
those courts falls within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause of
Article I.93 Thus, the application of a FRCP is no real problem for
federalism for, if it arguably regulates procedure, it traces to Congress’
Article I authority. There is one catch however. According to the REA
itself, a federal rule that displaces state law too much could still be
prohibited.94 However, this limitation in the REA has proven toothless
over the years, as FRCP that affect substantive rights (for instance FRCP
35, which abridges the right of privacy)95 have survived challenge. And,
recently, the difficulty of keeping the Erie line of cases distinct from the
Hanna line has become more challenging, as federal courts continue to
issue decisions that construe the meaning of open-textured provisions of
federal rules much in the manner of common law decision-making.96
What is clear in the evolution from Swift through Erie to Hanna is
that the opportunity for reshaping or displacing state law utilizing the
federal judicial power persists through the federal courts’ power to
regulate procedure. With the appearance of Hanna v. Plumer in 1965,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal procedural statutes
were effectively immunized from displacement by conflicting state
law.97 This underscores that diversity jurisdiction and the Erie/Hanna
line of decisions themselves are as much about democracy as they are
about forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws.98
While they do impose restrictions and limitations on the federal
judiciary, they also preserve the constitutional space for federal courts to
determine procedural policies, in the main. When this power over
procedure intersects with diversity jurisdiction, it creates the risks for
political participation, transparency, and accountability that I have
identified. Moreover, because the possibility exists of effecting
92. Id. at 472. See also Weinstein, supra note 72, at 23.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 19.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) provides: “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.”
95. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941).
96. Consider, for example, the dispute between Justices Ginsburg and Scalia over which line
of cases governed the dispute over grounds for new trial in Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities,
518 U.S. 415, 467-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 468.
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substance through procedure via diversity, those who cannot achieve
changes in law at the state level now wish to make federal diversity
jurisdiction, more, not less, available. This raises the next point—
Congress’ rediscovery of “minimal diversity.”
In the 1806 decision of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,99 Chief Justice
Marshall established what is known as the requirement of “complete
diversity,”100 meaning that no commonality of citizenship can be shared
by opposing parties. Complete diversity is a substantial impediment to
moving state cases to the federal forum, for in controversies involving
numerous parties, some commonality of citizenship is likely, or a litigant
seeking to prevent diversity jurisdiction can add a nondiverse party, so
long as the requirements of joinder are present.101 However, in light of
the policy that federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited, not plenary,
and to reduce the intrusion on state prerogatives that diversity
jurisdiction can present, the requirement of complete diversity is
coherent. This restricts resort to federal courts for state-based litigation
only where prejudice against noncitizens is likely to be significant. Until
recently, Congress and the federal judiciary had been considering
jettisoning diversity jurisdiction altogether as modern travel and mass
communications have made the assumptions of parochialism
underpinning it unjustified.102 Even though these factors have not
produced the total elimination of diversity jurisdiction, Congress
continues to increase the amount in controversy requirement so that only
larger cases reach the federal courts.103 Thus, economics trumps the
potential for prejudice under the current diversity statute. All these
considerations indicate that the requirement of complete diversity should
not be relaxed absent extraordinary reasons. One such extraordinary
circumstance may have presented itself in 1917 when Congress passed
the federal interpleader statute, thereby introducing the concept of
minimal diversity as a way of opening up the federal courts.104
Minimal diversity requires only that some degree of difference in
99. 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
100. See id. at 267-68.
101. These arise from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 and require that liability stem from
the same transaction or occurrence, or series thereof, and demonstrate at least one issue of law or
fact in common to the parties joined. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
102. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 101 (1969) [hereinafter ALI, STUDY OF DIVISION]. See
also Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Gridlock: The Case for Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction, 10
BROOKINGS REV. 34, 34-39 (1992).
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), in which the current amount in controversy is set at
$75,000.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (2000).
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citizenship between adverse parties be present. In the interpleader
statute, minimal diversity is provided if at least two adverse claimants to
the same stake hail from different states.105 It is instructive that in the
history of federal subject matter jurisdiction from 1806 to the present the
requirement of complete diversity has rarely been relaxed and then only
primarily to remedy through interpleader the obvious justice problems
created for a defendant who must pay the same obligation twice.106 Yet
the proponents of tort reform argue that minimal diversity should be
used again to save them from the vagaries of state law.
III. “COMPLEX LITIGATION”—THE RATIONALE FOR INTRUSION
Litigation can be “complex” for a variety of reasons. The legal
issues presented could be novel or intellectually challenging, the parties
could be numerous, or the dispute could cross various state lines and
generate multiple lawsuits in different locales. Modernly, the meaning
of “complex litigation” has come to stand for class action practice or
multidistrict litigation involving mass torts (sometimes both) and is
closely associated with federal techniques that have been developed to
deal with these phenomena, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
governing class actions,107 the multidistrict litigation statute,108 and the
Manual on Complex Litigation.109
The first and most benign federal foray into the problems of
complex litigation arose in the late 1960s in response to the problem of
what has been called “scattered litigation,”110 that is, litigation involving
105. Id. The purpose of making the federal forum more available in this form of proceeding
was generated by the result in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916), where, due
to the intersection of principles of personal jurisdiction and the characterization of interpleader
actions as in personam, New York Life Insurance ended up having to pay the proceeds of a life
insurance policy twice. To avoid the possibility of this double liability being visited on frequent
stakeholders, Congress acted and passed a package of legislation that provided for easy entry to a
federal court, a minimal amount in controversy requirement of $500, nationwide service of process,
and generous venue. In State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967), the
Supreme Court explicitly upheld the constitutionality of minimal diversity by making it clear that
Strawbridge only construed the diversity statute, not the requirements of Article III.
106. Allowing “pendent party” jurisdiction so long as minimal diversity is present can be
treated as another exception. For instance, pendent party jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1330, is possible so long as there is minimal diversity. See 13B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §3567.2, at n.48 (Supp.
West 2004).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
109. See generally DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed.
2003) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION].
110. See Thomas D. Rowe & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty,
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multiple parties from various jurisdictions making it difficult to confine
the proceedings to one forum.111 In 1968, Congress dealt with the
phenomenon of multiple parallel actions pending in the federal courts
with the passage of legislation providing for transferring them to one
court for pre-trial proceedings.112 The legislation also created a panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) to administer the process.113 While the
emergence of MDL practice provided for consolidation of scattered
federal litigation, access to the MDL option still required that cases be
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in the first
instance. Since many multidistrict events involve torts, which are
creatures of state law, the requirement of complete diversity must be
satisfied. And, the more parties that are involved in an accident the less
likely complete diversity can be shown. This raised the possibility that
in mass torts, multiple actions might be filed in different states that could
not be consolidated in one location and generated calls to reform the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, much as it had been modified
in 1917 to address interpleader.114 As with interpleader, the possibility
of opening the federal forum depended upon utilizing the principle of
minimal diversity.
Three things are notable about the calls for reform that arose before
the mid-1980s: they were sensitive to the plight of all parties, not just
defendants; they were not overtly aimed at producing particular
substantive outcomes; and they predated innovations in federal
procedure that have increasingly burdened plaintiffs, such as changes in
standards for class action certification, changes in summary judgment
procedure, and the evolving principles governing expert opinion
evidence.
A. The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002
After many attempts over more than a decade,115 the Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter Rowe & Sibley]. See also
Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REV.
977 (1994) [hereinafter Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony] (documenting the work that remains of the
ALI’s Complex Litigation Project agenda).
111. See Linda Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORD. L.
REV. 169, 220-21 (1990).
112. Under the current version of the statute, cases are to be returned to their home fora for
trial. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (2000); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Beshad Hynes &
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). See infra text accompanying notes 117-120.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
114. See ALI, STUDY OF DIVISION, supra note 102, at 375-76.
115. See, e.g., Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st
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Multiforum Jurisdiction Act became law in 2002 (“the MPMFJA” or
“the Act”).116 A factor precipitating Congress’ attention to the problem
of multidistrict litigation was its desire to redress Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Beshad Hynes & Lerach,117 in which the Supreme Court
concluded that cases transferred to a particular court as MDL matters
could not be retained by that court for trial.118 Ironically, the version of
the Act as passed does not address this problem.119 Instead, it makes
dramatic changes in federal subject matter jurisdiction, because the Act
constitutes the first grant of subject matter jurisdiction.
The direct history of the multiparty, multiforum legislation that was
enacted is sparse, as the bill was part of an omnibus package involved
primarily with budgetary matters. However committee reports to prior
versions of the bill, such as H.R. 860, show that legislators were
concerned over how federalizing mass accident cases would impact
litigants and the states themselves. As Representative Watt described it:
For those of us who have been strong advocates for States’ rights, I
think this is a radical departure. When you start telling to a plaintiff
who lives in a State, who is suing a defendant who lives in the same
State, and you are going to apply that State’s laws that that case has to
be litigated for that plaintiff, he has to go into the U.S. District Court,
the Federal court, to litigate his claim, I think that is a radical departure
from where we are at this point. . . . Now let me just tell you that
every small-town person on this committee ought to be alarmed by
this, because in small towns there are not U.S. District Courts. There
are, in every county, State courts where individual plaintiffs can walk
right down the street, file a lawsuit, and get their claim litigated. You
all make it sound like the whole purpose for the court system is for the
convenience of the courts. That is not the purpose of the court system.
The purpose of the court system is for the convenience of litigants.120

Sess. (1989); Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990).
116. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020(b)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 1826 [hereinafter MPMFJA]. As
originally proposed, the Act required only twenty-five deaths; efforts are underway in Congress to
amend the Act to reduce the number from seventy-five deaths to twenty-five deaths. See
Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter
Multidistrict Restoration Act]. See also 150 Cong. Rec. H. 1378 (daily ed. March 24, 2004).
117. 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
118. Id. at 40-41.
119. However the pending Multiforum Jurisdiction Restoration Act does allow retention for
trial on liability of MDL consolidated matters and makes technical amendments to the MPMFJA.
Compare MPMFJA, supra note 116, and Multidistrict Restoration Act, supra note 116.
120. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MULTIDISTRICT, MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM TRIAL
JURISDICTION ACT OF 2001, H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 30 (2001) [hereinafter House Report H.R.
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Only by presenting H.R. 860 as a very narrow expansion of diversity
jurisdiction applying only to a very restricted body of cases were
proponents able to garner bipartisan support.121 As the Minority Report
to H.R. 860 stated:
It is our understanding that [the bill] would only apply to a very
narrowly defined category of cases, such as, plane, train, bus, boat
accidents and environmental spills, many of which may already be
brought in federal court. However, it would not apply to mass tort
injuries that involve the same injury over and over again such as
asbestos and breast implants.122

Moreover, H.R. 860 added features to limit intrusions on state power,
such as increasing the threshold for the relevant amount in controversy
that previous versions of the bill did not contain.123 Backers were also
eager to assure skeptics that multiforum legislation was not meant to
create a presumption that Congress could easily invoke minimal
diversity to displace state power or to smooth the path for other pending
bills such as the Interstate Class Action Act, which threatened to redirect
whole categories of proceedings based on state law to the federal sphere.
As Representative Sheila Jackson Lee put it:
H.R. 860 is a sharp distinction from the “Interstate Class Action
Jurisdiction Act of 1999.” Unlike H.R. 860, the class action bill
requires only minimal diversity for all civil actions brought as class
actions in federal court, regardless of the individual amounts in
controversy, the number of separate incidents or injuries that may give
rise to a class action, or the state-based nature of the claim. Rather
than providing a reasonable, limited modification to diversity
jurisdiction, the class action bill—which I strongly oppose—
represents a radical rewrite of the class action rules and would ban
most forms of state class actions.124

Despite all these caveats and limitations, the MPMFJA as enacted does
intrude significantly on state power and in a way that undermines the
democratic values of participation, transparency, and accountability. To
understand why this is so, it is useful to review the legislation in some
detail.
As the discussion of its predecessor, H.R. 860, indicates, key
860].
121.
122.
123.
124.
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provisions of the MPMFJA affect diversity and removal jurisdiction, as
well as intervention, venue, service of process, and subpoenas. In
essence, the Act opens up the federal forum for mass accident cases
based on state law by exploiting the principle of minimal diversity and
then by expanding removal jurisdiction and intervention.
The
amendments to the removal statute especially enable defendants to
negate a plaintiff’s choice of the state forum. The Act has been likened
to a “vacuum cleaner” that can “suck up” all the cases, including state
proceedings, arising from a mass accident tort.125
To apply, a single accident must occur in a “discrete location” that
results in the deaths of at least seventy-five natural persons.126 The
federal district courts have original jurisdiction in such a situation if
there is minimal diversity between adverse parties127 and other
conditions are met. Significantly and notwithstanding the concerns
expressed in the debate over H.R. 860, no amount in controversy is
required.128 Following previous suggestions for multidistrict litigation
reform, the statute introduces the concept of “residence” as
significant.129 The presence of minimal diversity provides the bare
constitutional predicate for jurisdiction under Article III for the
MPMFJA, but the Act further requires: that a defendant “reside” in one
state and a “substantial” portion of events takes place in another; that
two defendants “reside” in different states; or that “substantial” parts of
the accident take place in different states.130 However, this focus on
residency does not function as a real limitation on the reach of the statute
because under the Act a corporation is deemed to reside in any state in
which it is registered or has a license to do business.131 Thus, most
corporate defendants will have multiple residences and any of them can
suffice to activate the MPMFJA. For example, in a mass tort in which a
nationwide oil company might be a defendant, so long as one of the
plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from the oil company, minimal
diversity is met and Article III is satisfied.132 Although on these facts at
125. See Peter Adomeit, The Station Nightclub Fire and Federal Jurisdictional Reach: The
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 243, 247
(2003).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (West 2003).
127. Id.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (West 2003).
129. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 110, at 10-11.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (West 2003).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (West 2003).
132. This follows from the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the requirement of complete
diversity is congressional, not constitutional. See State Farm & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,
531 (1967).
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least one plaintiff must be a citizen of a state different from a defendant,
the residency requirement will be met easily, as the oil company is a
“resident” of many (perhaps every) state and one of those states will
likely be in a different location from the accident.133 By its express
terms, the statute designates that it is irrelevant whether a defendant is
also a resident where a substantial portion of the events took place or
whether defendants with two different residences are also residents of
the same state. Unlike the manner in which corporate citizenship
functions, multiple corporate residences will make it easier to qualify for
the Act’s grant of subject matter jurisdiction, not harder. While the
enlargement of original federal subject matter jurisdiction under
MPMFJA is novel, the effect the statute has on removal is particularly
important, for it negates the plaintiff’s forum choice in a way that injects
uncertainty into the question of when and whether removal will be
sought.
Traditionally, removal is parasitic of original subject matter
jurisdiction, so that one may remove a claim where the plaintiff’s wellpleaded complaint presents a federal question or where diversity
jurisdiction would have allowed the plaintiff to file originally in the
federal forum.134 However, when the plaintiff has chosen to go to a
defendant’s home state court on a state claim, removal is not
available.135 The rationale is that the defendant need not typically be
concerned with achieving a more neutral forum, when the plaintiff has
submitted to the very state court system from whence the defendant
hails.136 The MPMFJA dispenses with this limitation so that even where
plaintiffs have gone to a defendant’s home state court to litigate causes
of action created by state law, the defendant may still remove to the
federal forum.137 But, the removal right goes further. The statute also
133. As Rowe and Sibley put it: “This situation will always exist if defendants have different
residences as it will if a defendant has a certain residence and at least part of the acts or omissions
occurred elsewhere.” See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 110, at 26-27 (footnotes omitted). It is
important to note that the statute retains the standard definition of corporate citizenship for purposes
of meeting the minimal diversity requirement as the place of incorporation and the principal place of
business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (West 2003).
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (West 2003).
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (West 2003).
136. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723, at
568 (1998).
137. Among other things, the Act’s amendments to the removal statute provide:
(e) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a defendant in a
civil action in a State court may remove the action to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where the action is pending if–
(A) the action could have been brought in a United States district court under section
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provides that if a defendant is a party in an existing MPMFJA action (or
even in an action that is not brought under the Act, but could have been)
and that defendant is also a party in a state proceeding that arises from
the “same accident,” the defendant can remove the state court action,
even if it could not have been brought originally in a federal court on its
own.138 Apparently this could apply even in the circumstance where
parties in the state court action are citizens of the same state, because
upon removal and consolidation with the MPMFJA action, minimal
diversity would exist, so that Article III’s minimum requirements would
be met.139 Perhaps this is just a variation on the theme of supplemental
jurisdiction, but one in which the action that provides the anchor claim
itself does not satisfy complete diversity. In this way, the MPMFJA
does function as a kind of vacuum cleaner and allows the defendant
tremendous latitude to turn on the switch. When it is remembered that
the claims for relief subject to the Act do not all themselves have to be
claims for death, but can encompass claims for personal injury and
property damage, the significant expansion of removal jurisdiction that
this represents becomes more stark.
The procedure for removal requires intricate coordination with state
courts. Unlike traditional removal, the defendants do not have to be
unanimous in their decision to seek the federal forum–only one
defendant need petition.140 Perhaps most critically for plaintiffs, the
time limit for removal is very uncertain as the petition may be filed “at
any time before trial of the action in State court” so long as it is within
thirty days of the time when the removing defendant first becomes a
party to the MPMFJA action.141 Even this limit is not dependable, as the
federal court has the discretion to allow even later removal.142 One can
only imagine the kind of strategic lever this gives defendants, who may
wish to escape state proceedings that are not going well and in which
1369 of the title; or
(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or
in part, under section 1369 in a United States district court and arises from the same
accident as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could not have
been brought in a district court as an original matter.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (West 2003).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (West 2003).
139. The statute provides: “An action removed under this subsection [28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)]
shall be deemed to be an action under section 1369 [the MPMFJA] and an action in which
jurisdiction is based on section 1369 of this title.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(5) (West 2003).
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (West 2003) (providing that “a defendant . . . may remove”
(emphasis added)).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B) (West 2003).
142. Id.
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plaintiffs have already invested time and money.
Once removed to the federal court, the state matter resides there
until a liability determination has been made. Thereafter, it is remanded
to the state court for assessment of damages, unless the federal court
finds that it should be retained for convenience and justice reasons.143
The decision to remand to state court is not reviewable “by appeal or
otherwise.”144 When the matter is removed to the federal court, the court
may transfer it or dismiss it on grounds of inconvenient forum.145 In
parallel fashion, the Act also provides a right to intervene in any federal
action “which is or could have been brought” as an MPMFJA action ,
even if the intervenor could not have brought her claim originally in
federal court. Once an action is in federal court on the basis of 28
U.S.C. § 1369—either originally, on removal, or as an intervenor’s
claim—the district court must promptly notify the federal MDL panel
that the action is pending. This is obviously a requirement to facilitate
the transformation of an MPMFJA matter into an MDL matter under 28
U.S.C. § 1407.
Relaxed subject matter jurisdiction is not the only benefit that the
MPMFJA brings. Like the interpleader statute, it allows for liberal
venue and personal jurisdiction. The legislation amends the venue
statute to provide that venue can be had in any district where any one
defendant resides or where a substantial portion of the events took
place.146 There is no need that all defendants reside in the same state.
Following this theme, the Act provides for nationwide and international
service of process,147 but it goes even further and also authorizes
nationwide and international service of subpoenas so that witnesses can
be required to travel long distances to comply with the court’s
directions.148
Clearly the MPMFJA imposes heavy burdens on plaintiffs in
actions subject to its reach and can create real administrative problems
for state courts that will not be able to predict or effectively manage
mass accident tort actions filed in their systems given the open-textured
nature of the removal/remand possibilities. Perhaps sensitive to the
encroachment on state prerogatives that it can produce, the Act includes

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(3) (West 2003).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(4) (West 2003).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(6) (West 2003).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(g) (West 2003).
28 U.S.C. § 1697 (West 2003).
28 U.S.C. § 1785 (West 2003). The applicant for such a subpoena must show good cause.

Id.
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an abstention provision. Unfortunately, its operation is ambiguous, so
that no one in the multidistrict drama will be able to predict with
confidence whether abstention might occur. The statute directs that a
federal court “must abstain” from exerting its section 1369 power, if (1)
“a substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of
which the primary defendants are also citizens,” and (2) “the claims
asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State.”149
Unfortunately the MPMFJA makes no attempt to define “substantial
majority,” “primary defendants,” or “governed primarily.”150
What is the impact of the MPMFJA on the democratic values of
participation, transparency, and accountability?
First and most
obviously, by redirecting these cases to the federal forum, the
controversies they involve are farther removed from the reach of local
political communities, both geographically and conceptually. As
Representative Watt pointed out, no longer is the plaintiff simply able to
walk down the street to the local county court, but she may be required
to travel significant distances to litigate her claims.151 This physical
distance problem is only magnified when a mass accident tort, after
being funneled to the federal forum, is sent to an even more distant
federal court for coordinated MDL proceedings. But, it is not just the
litigants who have a stake in the outcome; the community most affected
by the mass tort does as well. By literally “distancing” these
constituencies from proceedings, federalization limits their participatory
opportunities. At a more conceptual level, many of the critical rulings in
mass accident proceedings will be procedural. As I have described,
procedural means for affecting substantive results make participation,
transparency, and accountability values much more difficult to sustain.
Procedure is arcane and therefore less accessible to laypersons.
Procedural rulings made in a distant forum by a federal, not a state,
judge confuse questions of accountability. When citizens become aware
of the possibility that the results in mass accident cases in federal courts
may vary significantly from those in state proceedings, mobilizing a
political response will prove more difficult, as the intricate
legislative/judicial dance bringing it about will be hard to understand.
But perhaps these consequences are tolerable when balanced against the
particular and isolated problems of mass accident torts. When the same
considerations are applied to class actions, serious questions of

149. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (West 2003).
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (West 2003).
151. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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democratic legitimacy arise.
B. The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)
This issues raised by class action reform on the model of CAFA are
hotly contested and it is possible that proponents will not be able to
muster sufficient backing to see the legislation enacted by both houses of
Congress in the near future.152 Nonetheless support for federal
legislation controlling class actions is strong in the business
community.153 For this reason it is unlikely that the technique of using
the judicial power of the national government to achieve the effect of
substantive legislation in this area will be jettisoned. Hence, close study
of the CAFA is warranted. To see clearly the policy questions that are at
stake, I have used S. 274, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, as the
focus of the discussion because it was the lightening rod for sustained
policy debate. A revised version of S. 274, S. 2062 is currently pending.
Its jurisdictional provisions are substantially similar.154
Doubtless many would be surprised to learn that diversity
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution gives Congress
independent power to regulate interstate commerce (and one the backers
of the CAFA hope will be resistant to the United States Supreme Court’s
cases restricting the commerce power under Article I).155 This high wire
act of an indirect and unregulated commerce power is to be
accomplished under the CAFA through the concept of an “interstate”
class action.
In general, proponents of the CAFA charge that a mere “glitch”156
in federal diversity jurisdiction—the requirement of complete
diversity—has allowed the plaintiff’s bar to unfairly “game the system,”
152. For instance, in October 2003, a motion to invoke cloture in regard to S. 274 failed by one
vote. See 72 U.S.L.W. 2476 (February 17, 2004). In February of 2004, S. 2062, the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2004, was introduced in the Senate. It is the successor legislation to S. 274 and S.
1751. On February 11, 2004 Senate Majority Leader William Frist delayed consideration of the
legislation indefinitely due the possibility of unrelated amendments being introduced by Democrats.
Id. For a list of bills dealing with the topic of class action fairness and jurisdiction see supra note 5.
153. Study and compromise regarding the legislation is still ongoing. In March 2004,
Professors Arthur Miller and Samuel Issacharoff met with Senate staff regarding the effect of the
legislation. In addition, some senators previously opposed to class action legislation indicate that
they may support S. 2062, see Senate Staff Confers with Legal Experts on Possible Changes to
Class Action Bill, 72 U.S.L.W. 2559-60 (March 23, 2004).
154. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004). One of the primary
concerns in this legislation is the phenomenon of the coupon settlement.
155. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35.
156. The Senate Report actually uses the term “glitch.” See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, §
IV.
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by filing nationwide class actions in state courts that are then mishandled
to the detriment of corporate defendants by incompetent or
overburdened state judges. Thus, it is plaintiffs’ lawyers who are
unfairly abusing the current diversity and removal jurisdiction of the
federal courts. According to the Senate Majority Report on CAFA,
these lawyers perpetrate this abuse by joining nondiverse parties so as to
keep their state-based claims in the state courts.157 The majority finds
this desire illegitimate, for according to it, diversity jurisdiction itself
negates the rule that a plaintiff’s choice of forum should carry weight or
the constitutional principle that, in general, state courts should determine
claims based on state law.
Beyond its contested reading of diversity jurisdiction, the CAFA
redresses a number of specific harms alleged to flow from the current
system of state class action litigation— that plaintiffs’ lawyers receive
too much money in fees;158 that “judicial blackmail” by state judges
forces settlement of “frivolous cases”;159 that the due process rights of
defendants are being harmed;160 that copycat state class actions arise and
allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to unfairly shop among state forums;161 that
inadequate notice and representation to absent class members are
afforded;162 and that settlements improperly give named class
representatives a “bounty” or geographically prefer certain class
members to others.163 In addition, reformers argue that the ability of one
state to apply its law to determine issues in a nationwide class action
violates principles of “horizontal” federalism, because it does not respect
the laws of sister states.164
157. Of course, just who is playing games is in the eye of the beholder. The Senate Report has
nothing to say about the widespread defendant practice of removing state-based actions to the
federal forum whenever diversity is present, and to go to tremendous lengths to make sure that it is
present. Consider, for instance, the litigation strategy of Audi and Volkswagen of America in the
celebrated personal jurisdiction case, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
These defendants spent large amounts of money litigating personal jurisdiction all the way to the
United States Supreme Court in order to achieve the dismissal of their non-diverse codefendants.
See id. at 299. When this strategy worked and the plaintiffs were forced to amend their complaint,
the remaining defendants removed the action to the federal forum, where they eventually won the
action on liability.
158. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § IV.D.1. But see FCJ, Attorney Reports, supra note
3 (raising doubts concerning the difference in class certification in the state and federal courts).
159. Id. § IV.D.2.
160. Id. § IV.D.3.
161. Id. § IV.D.4.
162. Id. § IV.D.5.
163. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § IV.D.6.
164. Id. § IV.E. However, this too is limited by constitutional principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 834-35 (1985) (holding that the Full
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The list makes clear that by manipulating the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts, the authors of the CAFA hope to reduce the amount
of money plaintiffs’ lawyers can earn in state-based cases, to facilitate
the dismissal of cases they find “frivolous,” and to regulate the terms
and conditions on which parties may settle. More globally, the CAFA is
designed to make it much more difficult for products liability actions
and mass tort cases to be brought as class actions at all, because the
legislation specifically requires that the federal standards for class
certification—an increasingly demanding requirement—be applied to
them and the bill’s drafters assume that these actions will not be
certified.165 Critics charge that another motive of the legislation is to
foreclose any remedy for small consumer claims, and to delay and
impede state environmental and civil rights litigation through the
complex and uncertain removal/remand process that the statute
introduces.166 Just how might these consequences arise? How does the
statute work?
Like the Multiparty Multiforum Jurisdiction Trial Act, the Class
Action Fairness Act trades on the concept of minimal diversity.
Amendments to the diversity statute provide that the federal courts have
original jurisdiction over any civil action in which the amount in
controversy exceeds $5,000,000, is brought as a “class action,” and in
which any member of the class of plaintiffs is a citizen different from the
state of any defendant.167 Abrogating the result in Zahn v. International
Paper Co.,168 the individual claims of class members may be freely
aggregated to reach this jurisdictional amount.169 The difference in
citizenship between any one class member and any defendant, a
condition likely to exist in almost all class actions, satisfies the bare
requirements of Article III. This minimal difference in citizenship taken
together with the $5,000,000 threshold for the amount in controversy (in
the original House version only $2,000,000 activated jurisdiction170)
apparently defines the character of the class action as “interstate,” at
Faith and Credit Clause requires states to interpret the laws of other states in good faith, as those
laws would be applied by the home state courts).
165. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § VII.
166. Id. § X.
167. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)).
168. 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that each plaintiff in a FRCP 23(b) class action lawsuit
must meet the jurisdictional requirements for standing, including amount in controversy
requirements and that those who do not must be dismissed from the case). Zahn was superseded by
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (West 2003). See, e.g., Payne
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D. Mass. 2002).
169. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4.
170. See CAFA, H.R. 1115, supra note 5, § 4.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 3
LIND2.DOC

748

5/28/2004 11:35 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:717

least in the eyes of the bill’s advocates.171 Generally, no distinction is
made between the types of claims being brought—for instance, between
state consumer protection actions or a toxic tort occurring in one
location. Amendments designed to make this distinction were generally
rejected by the Senate Judiciary Committee.172
Like the MPMFJA, the CAFA also profoundly changes removal
jurisdiction. It provides that any class member, including unnamed
members, may remove,173 an innovation in light of the practice that the
named class representative picks the forum. Any one defendant may
remove, even if the action has been filed in the defendant’s home
state.174 The right of removal is unilateral; no consent by any other party
is required.175 As with the MPMFJA, the time for removal is enlarged
and made uncertain. State class actions can be removed before or after
certification,176 a plaintiff class member may remove anytime within 30
days of receiving notice of the pending state class action,177 and the oneyear outside time limit on removal is not applicable.178 Removed actions
that do not meet the jurisdictional requirements are subject to remand,
although the Majority Committee Report exhorts that when in doubt,
federal courts should err on the side of finding jurisdiction.179 An order
remanding a removed action to state court is reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.180

171. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § III.
172. Id. § II.
173. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 5 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)(2):
“[a] class action may be removed to a district court of the United States . . . by any plaintiff class
member who is not a named or representative class member without the consent of all members of
such class”).
174. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b): “[a] class action may be removed to a
district court of the United States . . . without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the
State in which the action is brought”).
175. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)(1): “[a] class action may be removed to
a district court of the United States . . . by any defendant without the consent of all defendants”).
176. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 5 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c): “[t]his
section shall apply to any class action before or after the entry of a class certification order in the
action”).
177. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d): “[s]ection 1446 relating to a defendant
removing a case shall apply to a plaintiff removing a case . . . if a plaintiff class member files notice
of removal within 30 days after receipt . . . of the initial written notice of the class action”).
178. Id.
179. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § VI.4 (noting, for example, that “in cases in which it
is unclear whether ‘the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less
than 100,’ a federal court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the matter”).
180. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 5 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(e):
“notwithstanding section 1447(d), an order remanding a class action to the State court from which it
was removed shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise”).
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Once a state class action is in federal court either on original
jurisdiction or removal, the CAFA mandates that it shall be dismissed if
the federal court determines that the action fails to meet the criteria for
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.181 This
applies despite the fact that the action may already have been certified as
a class action under state laws. If an action fails to achieve class
certification at the federal level, the complaint may be amended and it
may be filed again as a state class action, but again, it is vulnerable to
the unilateral removal by any defendant or class member.182
Some limits on this broad jurisdictional grant have been imposed.
But critics charge that they are difficult to administer and will inevitably
delay and unsettle ongoing state litigation to the detriment of plaintiffs.
If two-thirds or more of the plaintiffs are from the same state as the
“primary defendants,” if the primary defendants are state actors, or if the
number of all class members is less than 100, then the grant of
jurisdiction does not apply and the action may proceed as a state class
action.183 In contrast, if at least one-third, but less than two-thirds, of
class members are citizens of a state different from any primary
defendants, then the federal court has discretion to abstain from asserting
jurisdiction.184 This discretion is not unfettered, but is subject to definite
guidelines, and again, in cases of doubt, the drafters exhort the retention
of jurisdiction.185 These guidelines include whether the claims involve
matters of national or interstate interest, whether they will be subject to
the laws of more than one state, the dispersal of citizenship among
states, and whether the action could be expected to generate
“copycats.”186 Clearly, standards referring to matters of national interest
or whether copycat litigation might be anticipated are open-textured. In
addition, the CAFA does not fix the moment in time when the numerical
requisites relative to class membership are to be determined, for the
abstention provision or generally. This makes it very difficult for class
counsel to predict whether a matter filed as a state class action would be
181. See id. § 4 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7)(A): “[a] district court shall
dismiss any [class action lawsuit] . . . if the court determines the action may not proceed as a class
action based on a failure to satisfy the prerequisites of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure”).
182. See id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7)(B): plaintiffs may file an
amended class action in Federal or State court, but “any such action filed in State court may be
removed to the appropriate district court if it is an action of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction”).
183. See id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)).
184. See id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)).
185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
186. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)).
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susceptible to federal jurisdiction in the first place, or to abstention later,
if removed. As with the MPMFJA, this introduces a high degree of
uncertainty into state class action proceedings, and motivates those who
wish to avoid wasted litigation to file first in federal court. From a
practical perspective, the presence of the statute converts all but a few
state class actions into federal proceedings.
C. Alternatives to Intrusion
Despite the risks to democratic values that enlarging diversity may
present, defendants’ claims that state class actions expose them to
unjustified abuses also deserve attention. One obvious way to take those
claims seriously is to assess their factual basis. Several in-depth studies
of the contested questions about class actions have been conducted by
the Rand Corporation.187 One comprised a case study of ten consumer
class actions from 1989 to 1996.188 The results were equivocal and
depended on a number of preliminary normative questions. As the
authors noted: “Without a consensus on what the social utility of damage
class actions should be, there can be no consensus on how to weigh the
social benefits of class actions against their costs.”189 Notwithstanding
this caveat, the results of the study indicate that the claims of tort
reformers are likely overblown. For instance, in regard to the notion that
plaintiffs’ lawyers initiate class actions on their own and
opportunistically exploit forum possibilities, the authors stated:
Our case studies of ten class actions tell a more textured tale [than
anecdotal accounts] of how damage class actions arise. Class actions
are complex social dramas. Plaintiff class action attorneys play a
crucial role, but so do individual consumers, regulators, journalists,
and ordinary lawyers. Defendants’ roles in the litigation vary: They
contest some suits vigorously, but pursue certification when it appears
to offer an efficient means of capping liability exposure. The
choreography of the litigation is often complicated: Class action
attorneys seek out jurisdictions where they think their suits will fare
well, but cases move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and new actors
appear and disappear from the stage. Although lawyers drive the
drama to its conclusion, it is American society and culture that provide
the ingredients for the story.190

187.
188.
189.
190.

See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., DILEMMAS, supra note 26, at 5.
Id. at 140-41.
Id. at 401-02 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 402.
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In fact, the study raised this possibility: “Although public commentary
frequently depicts damage class actions as plaintiff lawyers’ suits, an
alternative view is that they are the creatures of defendants’ desires to
forestall more costly forms of litigation or continued consumer
complaints.”191 With regard to the question of forum choice in general,
the study asserted:
Whether forum choice ought to be constrained in damage class actions
poses another dilemma for public policymakers. On the one hand,
broad forum choice for class action derives from our federal system of
laws, which has deep historic roots and is a central feature of our
democratic system of government. Moreover, the availability of
multiple fora may sometimes provide access to compensation through
the courts to consumers who would not otherwise have redress.
Whether one views this access as good or bad depends, of course, on
one’s perspective on the merits of using damage class actions for such
redress.192

In general, the study suggests that the data is much more nuanced than
the claims of tort reformers suggest and cannot be disaggregated from
one’s pre-exiting normative inclinations. One of the more recent and
embarrassing studies for those who argue state class actions must be
reigned in is the study conducted by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey
P. Miller.193 Among other things, it shows that the attorneys fees
awarded to class counsel in federal cases, at least until recently, are
actually larger on average than those awarded by state courts.194 For
their part, tort reformers counter with a number of empirical studies and
anecdotal accounts that they believe do show significant abuses.195 It
seems unlikely that a resort to empirics alone can resolve the question.
Even if one were to assume for purposes of argument that many of
the claims of tort reformers are true, it does not settle the question of
whether state tort law should be federalized through the back door of
procedural manipulation. Because the risks to democratic values may be
too high, all viable alternatives to transforming diversity jurisdiction
191. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
192. HENSLER ET AL., DILEMMAS, supra note 26, at 415-16.
193. See Civil Procedure—Class Actions: Study Disputes Rising Attorney Fees, Recoveries in
Class Action Settlements, 72 U.S.L.W. 2412 (January 20, 2004) (reporting on an examination of the
results of 370 class action settlements reported for the period 1993-2002).
194. Id.
195. See LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 172-73. See also Manhattan Institute for Policy
Research, Civil Justice Reports, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mi_
publications_cont_1.htm#cjr (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (listing several empirical studies of class
action lawsuits).
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should be explored. In fact, canvassing the list of abuses identified by
the backers of CAFA reveals it contains items that could be attacked
directly on the federal constitutional grounds of procedural due process.
This suggests that if these claims are serious, there is at least one
alternative to completely reordering federal subject matter jurisdiction—
defendants can directly object to the very due process abuses they allege.
The United States Supreme Court has long regulated the standards
of notice and opportunity to be heard that are constitutionally
required.196 And, even before the modern incarnation of class action
practice, the Court spoke on the due process implications of inadequate
representation by named class representatives with the celebrated
decision of Hansberry v. Lee.197 Another avenue would be to pursue not
just procedural, but substantive, due process claims. Obviously state
laws that violate rights protected by the United States Constitution
cannot trump those rights.198 If the due process rights of defendants are
profoundly violated, they might argue that their fundamental rights are
being infringed or equal protection violated. In fact, this has been a
successful campaign in the case of punitive damages.199 Over the last
decade the United States Supreme Court’s punitive damages
jurisprudence has changed from one where the only check on state
practice was procedural due process,200 to one in which a substantive
right has been conferred on defendants not to be liable for punitive
damage amounts that are too large.201 This trajectory might prove
fruitful for other items of damages, especially nonpecuniary damages,202

196. See Conn. v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (providing a multifactorial test for determining
constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (among
other things, construing the constitutionality of notice in class actions); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (establishing the federal constitutional standard for
adequate notice of the pendency of an action).
197. 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (recalling that members of a “class not present as parties to the
litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties
who are present”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 362-63 (1999).
198. This is axiomatic given the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
199. See Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 23-25
(1997).
200. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
201. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
202. This is because many of the arguments used to constitutionalize the issues involved in
punitive damages have also been made in regard to nonpecuniary compensatory damages, such as
awards for pain and suffering or mental distress. The Supreme Court itself recognized these
similarities. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 467-68 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also, JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and
Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 268 (2003).
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but it seems much less likely to upset the long-embedded state commonlaw principles of tort liability. And, given the distinction between
economic rights and other kinds established by United States v.
Carolene Products,203 as well as the principle that differential effects do
not establish an intent to discriminate under Washington v. Davis,204 it is
difficult to see what arguments repeat corporate defendants could use to
strike neutrally worded state tenets of negligence, products liability, and
the like as a violation of the federal Constitution.205 In reality, it looks as
though tort reformers want to have it both ways in regard to state class
actions—to invoke due process as a reason to reorder state/federal
relations without having to actually put their due process claims to the
test.
John S. Baker, Jr., has suggested another way to address the claims
of repeat defendants without fundamentally changing the regime of
diversity jurisdiction. For him, a serious charge concerning state class
actions derives from the application of one state’s law to determine a
defendant’s liability in multiple geographic areas.206 This is the problem
of conflict of laws in the class action context. He argues that if the
limitations on one state’s reach established by Phillips Petroleum v.
Shutts207 are not sufficient, then under the Full Faith and Credit Clause208
Congress might have the authority to craft a body of national class action
rules that could be employed to determine contested conflicts questions
in state-based, nationwide class proceedings.209
Leaving aside the questions of conflict of laws, another avenue to
pursue would be to curb abusive state class actions in the very states
where the most egregious abuses occur. In fact some states that have
been identified as particularly problematic have instituted reforms on
their own.210 Dramatic reformulations of diversity jurisdiction instituted
for the purpose of bypassing the states would retard this natural process
of state self-correction and undercut the very role of the states in the

203. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
204. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
205. See Baker, supra note 38, at 721.
206. Id. at 719, 729-32.
207. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
209. Baker, supra note 38, at 713.
210. For instance, this seems to be what is happening in Louisiana. See generally Donald C.
Massey, Louis C. LaCour, Jr., & Valerie M. Sercovich, Curtailing the Tidal Surge: Current
Reforms in Louisiana Class Action Law, 44 LOY. L. REV. 7 (1998) (profiling state and federal class
action law with an emphasis on mass tort class actions as a backdrop for analyzing the history of
Louisiana class action lawsuits and consequent reform efforts in the state).
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constitutional framework.211
Finally, if after all these alternatives were exhausted and abuses still
existed, the nature and extent of the changes need not be as extensive as
the proponents of the CAFA intend.212 For instance, in a letter dated
March 26, 2003, to the Senate Judiciary Committee in regard to S. 274,
the Judicial Conference reiterated its disquiet about the legislation as
written, out of a concern for its impact on the caseload of the federal
courts and the effect on state/federal relations.213 As the Conference
stated: “Congress should be encouraged to include sufficient limitations
and threshold requirements so that federal courts are not unduly
burdened and states’ jurisdiction over in-state class actions is left
undisturbed . . . .”214 A major limitation the Conference suggested was
based on the type of class action involved; i.e., in the case of consumer
class actions based on fraud or warranty law, or environmental disasters,
state courts should have dominance.215 But the interest of proponents in
these alternatives seems to have waned — they do not primarily bring
procedural or substantive due process challenges to the basic regime of
the state common law of torts, they do not wish to explore a national
body of conflict rules, and they have been unmoved by claims that some
actions must be retained by the states due to their fundamental local
character. Why is this the case? It is possible that the real goal is to
curtail mass tort class actions altogether by redirecting them to the
federal forum where they will be obstructed so profoundly that
defendants’ overall liability will be reduced. Tort reformers may not be
interested in incremental change that preserves the democratic elements
of federalism if they can limit their liability by procedural means under
the radar screen of popular will.

211. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
212. Recall, this is the rationale for the MPMFJA. Moreover, the possibility of states
replicating the federal MDL process in some fashion ought to be considered.
213. See Letter from the Judicial Conference to the Senate Judiciary Committee, (Mar. 26,
2002) (copy on file with author).
214. Id. at 1.
215. Id.
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IV. TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD
Proponents of tort reform are intentionally harnessing procedure to
displace state law that they deplore. Their strategy involves a two-step
process. As I have shown, the first step is to redirect litigation into the
federal forum by way of minimal diversity; the second is to rely on the
different procedural rules applicable there to produce different
substantive results.216 Three areas of procedural difference, class action
certification, summary judgment, and summary judgment substitutes,
show just how effective this strategy can be.
A. Class Action Certification
A strong motive for redirecting state class actions into the federal
forum is the hope of tort reformers that class certification will be much
more difficult to achieve there—at least for the purpose of actually
trying class action controversies.217 The best evidence of this is the
affirmative requirement in the CAFA itself that the state-based class
actions must be dismissed if they do not meet the certification
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23:
A district court shall dismiss any civil action that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the court solely under this subsection [28 U.S.C. §
1369] if the court determines the action may not proceed as a class
action based on a failure to satisfy the prerequisites of rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.218

When this mandate is related to the fact that under the new system it is
possible for a party to seek removal of a state class after it has been
certified by the state court, the motive becomes even clearer. These
features of the legislation are an almost perfect expression of reformers’
claim that one of the main “abuses” of state class actions is improper
certification by state judges.219 The Majority Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on S. 274 shows clearly the majority’s belief that
there is a link between the procedure governing certification and
216. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
217. As Judith Resnick describes it, “Defendants . . . hope that, were cases channeled to federal
courts, fewer cases would be certified and fewer settlements approved.” Resnick, Constricting
Remedies, supra note 32, at 302. As John S. Baker, Jr., has noted, proponents of changes in the
diversity statute seem to assume that class certification will not occur. See Baker, supra note 38, at
711.
218. CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 4.
219. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35, § VII.2.
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substantive outcomes:
Because class actions are such a powerful tool, they can give a class
attorney unbounded leverage, particularly in jurisdictions that are
considered plaintiff-friendly. The reason for this unbounded leverage
in such jurisdictions is because, as a general rule, the question of
whether a class is properly certified can only be appealed following a
costly, and risky, trial. Thus, the Hobson’s choice is to either settle
frivolous suits, or invest in expensive litigation. Consequently, such
leverage can essentially force corporate defendants to pay ransom to
class attorneys by settling—rather than litigating—frivolous lawsuits.
This is a particularly alarming abuse because the class action device is
intended to be a procedural tool rather than a mechanism that affects
the substantive outcome of a lawsuit.220

It is not hard to see that the purpose of the legislation is to employ
another procedural tool — manipulation of diversity jurisdiction — to
produce a different substantive outcome. The CAFA makes the two-step
maneuver explicit through its goal of opening up diversity jurisdiction
for the purpose of imposing the federal, not the state, standard for class
action certification. As the ability to achieve class certification in the
federal courts may be increasingly difficult, it is possible that this
strategy will work.221
Several factors have come together to affect class action
certification in the federal forum in particular kinds of cases. In this era,
the health consequences of asbestos exposure, tobacco use, massmarketed pharmaceuticals and other products have generated the
phenomenon of the mass tort class action with thousands of potential
claimants seeking redress for personal injuries.222 Because these actions
involve common questions concerning defendants’ conduct or products,
but individual issues concerning the damages of particular class
220. Id. § IV.D.2 (emphasis added).
221. The new Federal Judicial Center study raises questions about how different state and
federal courts actually are regarding class certification. See FJC, Attorney Reports, supra note 3.
222. See, e.g., Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (asbestos case
establishing guidelines relating to certifiying a class action for settlement purposed only;
certification reversed); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing
trial court certification of class action in tobacco litigation action); In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine,
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (lawsuit involving more than six million class member with potential claims for
personal injury from taking prescription diet drugs). Mark Weber has argued in connection with the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Amchem that the real effect of the case is not so much to police
settlement as to place “a limit on the kinds of cases that may be brought as class actions.” Mark C.
Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor, 50 OH. ST. L.J., 1155, 1177 (1998).
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members, the lawsuits fall into the most controversial form of class
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the “damage” class
action under 23(b)(3).223 This type of action is the most difficult to
certify, as the court must not only find that the basic requisites of
certification under 23(a) are met,224 but that the common questions of
law or fact predominate over individual matters and that the class action
is the superior vehicle for resolving the controversy.225
The
characteristics of mass tort class actions that have given courts problems
are the need to individuate damages to class members, the choice of laws
questions, and increased possibilities of a conflict of interest among
class members.226
Although under Federal Rule 23, damage class actions are hardest
to certify, parties and trial judges often want them to be certified to
achieve an administrative regime for dealing with thousands of claims
that would clog the courts if brought individually. More importantly
from the defendant’s perspective, they can become means to impose a
“global settlement” on all class members.227 However, these goals are in
tension with another set of phenomena—tort reformers and many federal
judges, particularly at the appellate level, question whether mass torts
should be brought as class actions at all,228 and they believe that class
actions in general can lead to unjustified, often collusive, and unfair
settlements.229 In fact, the attitude of the federal courts toward class
actions is ambivalent.
223. In fact, under the pre 1966 revision of Rule 23, such class actions were referred to as
“spurious” class actions. See John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—the Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 705, 708 (1997).
224. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring as a prerequisite to certifying a class the existence of
numerous members that makes joinder impracticable, common questions of law or fact, claims or
defenses of the representative typical of other members of the class, and representative parties who
will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class).
225. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). The rule gives four additional factors for the court to consider
in making these judgments: the interests of the litigations in individually controlling the litigation,
whether other litigation is already pending, whether the litigation should be concentrated in one
forum, and the difficulties of class action management. In addition, the court is instructed to direct
notice to the members of the class of the right of each member to be excluded on request.
226. See, e.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 740-41; see also Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of
Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO 187-88 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2001) (analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s Castano decision and its aftermath).
227. See Nagareda, supra note 28, at 151-52 (observing that for the settling defendant, the
purchase of class members’ rights to sue, through claim preclusion, is one of the main purposes of
defendants).
228. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35. See also Greer Pagan, Renewed Resistance?: The
Federal Circuit Courts and the Problem of Mass Tort Class Actions, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 807, 832-41
(1997).
229. Pagan, supra note 228, at 832-41.
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The history and procedure of federal class actions have been
extensively analyzed, and it is not my purpose here to go over old
ground.230 The aims of the modernized class action in the federal courts
are contested. Some argue that their core purpose was to facilitate civil
rights litigation through the injunction class.231 Others argue that a
motivating force was to provide redress for litigants with claims too
small to be brought efficiently on an individual basis.232 The rule would
remedy that problem by allowing small claims to be amassed in a single
class action providing a controversy of pecuniary significance large
enough to attract attorney representation and efficient enough through
economies of scale to justify bringing the action233 But soon after the
emergence of modern Rule 23 as a result of the 1966 revisions, the
Supreme Court decided several cases that, ironically, redirected many
class actions to state forums.
Under normal principles, class actions based on state causes of
action must satisfy the regular requirements of diversity, that is, they
must show complete diversity of citizenship and that the amount in
controversy is satisfied. Perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court
established quite early on in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble234 that,
in litigation having a class action character, only the citizenship of the

230. See generally, STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing the development of the class action from early progenitors
in the Seventeenth Century to its modern form). See also, Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue
Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 714-17 (2003) (evaluating whether FRCP 23(c)(4)(A)
should be amended to authorize more innovative issue class actions and placing (c)(4)(A) within the
entirety of Rule 23); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941) (positing that modern society increasingly exposes
people to group injuries and the problem of fashioning an effective and inclusive group remedy is a
major issue); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 305 (1973) (arguing against a rigid narrowing of FRCP 23 considering that the organized
character of society affords the possibility of illegal behavior accompanied by wide-spread, diffuse
consequences, a procedural means should exist to remedy or deter that conduct).
231. See Hensler, Revisiting, supra note 27, at 179 (recalling the views expressed by members
of the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory Committee who amended Rule 23 to facilitate civil rights and
other class actions aimed at social reform).
232. See Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney
General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353,
397 (1988).
233. But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1420-21 (2003) (arguing that it is defendants who really enjoy economies of
scale in the mass tort class action).
234. 255 U.S. 356 (1921); accord Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1969) (dictum)
(observing that under current doctrine, “if one member of a class is of diverse citizenship from the
class’ opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit may be brought in federal
court even though all other members of the class are citizens of the same State as the defendant”).
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named parties is considered for purposes of diversity of citizenship.235
But when in the immediate post-1966 revision era the question arose of
whether class claims could be aggregated, the Court did not take such a
generous view. In two cases, it established that class members cannot
aggregate their individual claims for damages to meet the amount in
controversy requirement. Snyder v. Harris236 prohibited aggregation of
class claims, where none, standing alone, could meet the amount in
controversy requirement; Zahn v. International Paper Co.237 clarified
that even if the claim of the named representative(s) met the
jurisdictional amount, the claims of absent class members could not be
aggregated with the permitted claim.238 Taken together these decisions
foreclosed the federal forum for class actions based on an accumulation
of small individual claims, or even in mass tort situations where smaller
claims could not be added to larger ones to open the federal forum to the
whole class. As a result, the locus of class action activity began to shift
to the states.
It was not until the rise of the nationwide, state-based class action, a
phenomenon facilitated by another important Supreme Court decision,
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,239 that the move to control state class action
proceedings really got underway. In an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court concluded that unnamed class members of a
plaintiff classs need have no “minimum contacts” with the forum state
under principles of due process so long as they had sufficient notice,
adequate representation, the right to participate, and in the case of a
damages class action, the right to opt-out.240 In so doing, the Court
sharply contrasted the situation of plaintiff class members from
defendants—plaintiff members are not generally practically burdened by
the need to go to a distant forum and actively participate in the litigation,
and other features of the class action procedure protect their interests,
things such as the requirement that the named representative be
adequate, that the court supervises settlement, and the like.241 Thus the
235. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 225 U.S. at 364-66 (reversing a district court opinion that held
that joinder of a nondiverse party in a class action lawsuit defeated diversity jurisdiction).
236. 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) (holding that “[w]hen two or more plaintiffs, having separate
and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the
demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount”).
237. 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that “[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the
case – ‘one plaintiff may not ride in on another’s coattails’”).
238. Id. at 301-02.
239. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
240. Id. at 811.
241. Id. at 811-12.
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Court did not impose a due process requirement that absent class
members affirmatively “opt-in” to be included in class action litigation.
However, the Supreme Court did impose limits in the context of choice
of law, namely that in a nationwide class action, in order for the forum to
apply its own law, it must “have a ‘significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts’” to the class claims to create an interest
sufficient for the application of its law not to be “arbitrary or unfair.”242
According to tort reformers, the net result of Shutts was an explosion of
nationwide class actions for mass torts where state courts were called
upon to make difficult conflict of laws determinations beyond their
capabilities. Moreover, these nationwide classes were portrayed as
subjecting corporate defendants to frivolous lawsuits and putting them
under intense pressure to settle — to the detriment of themselves and
unnamed class members — due to the unjustifiable willingness of state
judges to certify matters as class actions. Concern for abusive class
action settlements and fee arrangements arose in the academy as well,
and it was not long before calls to revisit the question of mass class
actions arose and efforts to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
were undertaken.243
In 1998, the first non-technical change to Rule 23 since 1966 took
effect. Apparently persuaded by the argument that decisions to grant or
deny class action certification do indeed spell the death-knell for
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ relative litigation positions,244 the Advisory
Committee recommended adding a new subsection (f), granting the
federal circuit courts discretion to permit an interlocutory appeal from
the trial court’s decision to grant or deny class action status.245 The
grant of this new discretionary appellate power appears to be broad:
The courts of appeals will develop standards for granting review that
reflect the changing areas of uncertainty in class litigation. . . .
242. Id. at 821-22. For general discussions of the personal jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws
implications of Shutts, see Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an
Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85 (1997) and Linda S.
Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due Process: Implications for Mass
Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871 (1995).
243. For example, the American Law Institute initiated its Complex Litigation Project in 1986.
See Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony, supra note 110, at 979. See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT (1993). The first bills addressing the topic of multiparty,
multiforum mass torts began to be introduced in Congress. See supra note 115.
244. The “death knell” argument was first made in connection with attempts to craft a judgemade exception to the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1292. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). However, it has been unsuccessful in connection with class
action certification questions. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
245. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
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Permission to appeal may be granted or denied on the basis of any
consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive. Permission is
most likely to be granted when the certification decision turns on a
novel or unsettled question of law, or when, as a practical matter, the
decision on certification is likely dispositive of the litigation.246

This new opportunity for interlocutory appeal dovetailed with and
facilitated an increasing hostility on the part of federal appeals courts to
class action certification in the damage class actions that were located in
the federal forum.
The Seventh Circuit’s recent class action
jurisprudence is particularly revealing. Prior to the amendment, it
granted a writ of mandamus to review an order certifying a mass tort
class action brought on behalf of hemophiliacs who had contracted
AIDS from infected blood. Two of the more controversial aspects of the
decision, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,247 were its consideration of
the merits of the plaintiff’s claim as part of the certification question and
its arguable defendant bias in assessing the effect of the class action rule:
“[U]nder the district judge’s plan the thousands of members of the
plaintiff class will have their rights determined, and the four defendant
manufacturers will have their duties determined, under a law that is
merely an amalgam, an averaging, of the nonidentical negligence laws of
51 jurisdictions.”248 Moreover, throughout the opinion it was clear that
the court thought little of the plaintiff’s “serendipity” theory of
negligence. What was most troubling was the negative attitude the court
expressed toward damage class actions, an attitude that seemed projected
from a defense perspective, and not one of neutral concern for both
sides. Consider the court’s own words:
The reason that an appeal will come too late to provide effective relief
for these defendants is the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the
class action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or likely,
exposes them. . . . They might, therefore, easily be facing $25 billion
in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They
may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be
under intense pressure to settle. . . . We do not want to be
misunderstood as saying that class actions are bad because they place
pressure on defendants to settle. That pressure is a reality, but it must
be balanced against the undoubted benefits of the class action that have
made it an authorized procedure for employment by federal courts.

246. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note.
247. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
248. Id. at 1302.
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We have yet to consider the balance.249

The decision has little to say about the practical consequences on the
unnamed class members who were left with the choice to proceed with
individual actions or cease litigating at all. It is not unreasonable to
assume that given their health condition, many simply gave up due to
scarce resources and time constraints. If this is possible, then the court’s
refusal to sustain class certification had real cash value to the defendant.
It is hard not to conclude that by its approach to the certification
question—a procedural matter—the court intentionally affected the
substantive outcome in the case.
As one commentator notes,
“[o]bviously, the procedural rules affect the outcome of litigation. These
Circuit Courts [including the Seventh Circuit] seemed to ignore the
essence of Rule 23 because of their philosophical disagreement with the
effects of Rule 23.”250
The Seventh Circuit has continued to consider the merits of
plaintiffs’ claims when reviewing class action certification, and it has
developed the doctrine that even where the certification decision does
not appear erroneous, it is entitled to grant interlocutory appeals in order
to advance the general federal law governing class action practice.251
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decisions show a pattern of routinely
reversing class action certification in mass tort litigation and what
commentators have characterized an animus toward the class action
device itself.252 The Seventh Circuit is not alone. Class action
certification has been reversed in numerous significant proceedings
involving tobacco, asbestos, pharmaceuticals, and other matters.253 This
trend should only continue as a result of the most recent amendments to
Rule 23, amendments which institute the most significant change in the
nature of the rule since it was modernized in 1966.
Although the changes to Rule 23 have been described as “balanced
and neutral,”254 commentators also acknowledge that the revisions “may
prove to be more ground-breaking than they first appear,”255 and that
249. Id. at 1297-99 (citations omitted).
250. See Cabraser 2002, supra note 3, at 1223.
251. See Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999).
252. See Cabraser 2002 supra note 3, at 1239 (commenting on In re Bridgestone/Firestone
Products Liability Litigation, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002)).
253. See, e.g., supra note 223 and accompanying text.
254. See Joshua B. Gray and Michelle H. Seagull, Class Action Reaction: Amended Rule 23
Enhances Judicial Supervision in Class Litigation, 18 SPG-ANTITRU 91, 91 (2004). The claim is
also made that Rule 23 as amended does not really change matters, because it incorporates what
courts are already doing, i.e., “it appears to embody good practices.” Id.
255. Id.
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they “present significant new tactical choices for class action litigants
and new case management options for courts.”256 Hence, the 2003
amendments to Rule 23 may signal a sea-change in class action practice.
The changes are of three major types. First, they underscore the
importance of the certification decision itself and create a chronological
space for the infiltration of merits considerations into that decision. As
the Advisory Committee Note states:
Although an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not
properly part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the
certification decision often includes information required to identify
the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial. In this
sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the
“merits,” limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification
decision on an informed basis.257

Moreover, the trial court no longer has the discretion to conditionally
certify a class action, but must refuse certification if there is any doubt
whether the Rule 23 requirements are met.258
Second, the rule contemplates that courts exert much more control
over settlement, and it makes the settlement process in 23(b)(3) damage
classes uncertain, as it gives unnamed class members a post-settlement
possibility to opt-out.259 While some aspects of settlement will be
subjected to greater rigor, others will not. Significantly, the amended
rule does not require court supervision where there is settlement of
individual claims in a class action that is not yet certified.260 This
reverses the law of most circuits. This is curious, given the concern of
tort reformers, academics, and the Advisory Committee itself for
“collusive” settlements between preferred class members and
defendants.261 Nonetheless, in regard to certified class actions, the court
must make findings that any settlement approved is “fair, reasonable,

256. Id.
257. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note; see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 109, §§ 21.213, 30.11, 30.12 (discussing the requirement that a party
requesting class certification prepare a trial plan describing the issues likely to be presented at trial
and tests whether the issues are susceptible to class-wide proof).
258. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note.
259. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). The opt-out option is discretionary with the court, not mandatory.
See Julie B. Strickland and Stephen J. Newman, Recent Developments in Consumer Class Action
Litigation, 1414 PLI, CORP 9, 16-7 (2004).
260. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note; see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 109, § 30.41.
261. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
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and adequate.”262 The Advisory Committee also notes that settlement
may provide another opportunity to revisit the issue of the class
definition and may require additional notice.263 In general, the revisions
inject uncertainty about notice and may increase notice burdens for
23(b)(3) classes.264
Finally, the rule attempts to control the questions of legal
representation and attorneys’ fees by introducing new provisions that
cede greater managerial power to courts over the question of who shall
become class counsel and what and how counsel may be paid.265 This
may reflect what courts are already doing in practice, but the explicit
grant of managerial authority is significant. The Advisory Committee
states:
This subdivision [new 23(g)] recognizes the importance of class
counsel, states the obligation to represent the interests of the class, and
provides a framework for selection of class counsel . . . . The new
subdivision also provides a method by which the court may make
directions from the outset about the potential fee award to class
counsel in the event the action is successful.266

Carrying on this theme, new subsection (h) provides the court with
explicit directions as to its role in supervising the award of attorneys
fees. The Advisory Committee purports to be taking the law as it finds it
regarding the award of attorneys fees, but consider these remarks:
In many instances, the court may need to proceed with care in
assessing the value conferred on class members. Settlement regimes
that provide for future payments, for example, may not result in
significant actual payments to class members. In this connection, the
court may need to scrutinize the manner and operation of any
applicable claims procedure. In some cases, it may be appropriate to
defer some portion of the fee award until actual payouts to class
members are known. Settlements involving nonmonetary provisions
for class members also deserve careful scrutiny to ensure that these
262. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) advisory committee’s notes. The advisory committee notes
state that the standards for this determination are to be gleaned from In re: Prudential Insurance Co.
of America Sales Practice Litigation, 148 F.3d 283, 316-24 (3d Cir. 1998) and the Manual for
Complex Litigation. Id.
263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) advisory committee’s notes.
264. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1419,
1435-6 (2003) (characterizing the current class action member notice rules as flawed for allowing
judges the discretion to dispense with class notification in some categorical instances while insisting
on individual notice in other categories of cases).
265. FED R. CIV. P. 23(g).
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/3

48

Lind: "Procedural Swift"
LIND2.DOC

2004]

5/28/2004 11:35 AM

“PROCEDURAL SWIFT”

765

provisions have actual value to the class.267

It seems obvious that with its emphasis on certification and
reducing attorney autonomy in regard to settlement and fees, the
revisions of Rule 23 will have a differential impact on plaintiffs. Many
of the revisions bear uncanny witness to the “abuses” retailed by the
proponents of the Class Action Fairness Act, and in fact, they lobbied
the Judicial Conference in regard to the proposed changes in Rule 23 as
well as the Act itself.268 Coupled with the broad discretion invested in
the federal courts of appeals since 1998 to review certification decisions
and their frequent refusal to affirm certification, it is no wonder that the
proponents of CAFA insist that state-based class actions “shall be
dismissed” if they fail to achieve certification under Rule 23. But this is
apparently not enough for tort reformers. CAFA itself regulates federal
class action practice in a way that goes beyond, or even conflicts, with
Rule 23. Among its other features, this legislation demands particular
scrutiny by federal courts over coupon or other noncash settlements, any
settlement that would result in a net loss to class members after payment
of counsel fees, and it affirmatively prohibits “bounty” payments to
named representatives or differential payments to certain class members
on the basis of geography.269
In addition to these requirements, the CAFA prescribes in detail a
particular form of notice that must be given to absent class members.270
Significantly, it requires that notice be given to state and federal officials
of the pendency of the class action, so that these officials might
intervene, if desired, to police the fairness of the proceeding.271 From
the perspective of a state’s power, this might represent the worst of all
possible worlds—a constant redirection of class action litigation from
one’s state courts to the federal forum, with a concomitant need to
monitor and intervene in cases in that forum. The drafters of the CAFA
attempt to minimize the conflict between state and federal law by
arguing that most states have adopted some version of Federal Rule of
267. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note. But see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489
U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (recognizing that in some class action lawsuits the monetary relief obtained is
not the sole determinant of an appropriate attorney fee).
268. See Resnick, Constricting Remedies, supra note 32, at 298 (noting that in 2002 a “group
of lobbyists tried to persuade the Judicial Conference to join efforts to convince Congress to divest
state courts of jurisdiction over class actions, arising under state law, but involving large sums of
money and defendants doing business on a national scale”).
269. See CAFA, S. 274, supra note 5, § 3 (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712 –
1715).
270. Id.
271. Id. (proposing amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1717).
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Civil Procedure 23 and so should be following the federal standard,272 or
that whenever a federal court denies class certification it is likely doing
so on due process grounds, so that a state’s disagreement as to
certifiability impliedly violates constitutional principles.273
B. Of Summary Judgment
The technique of redirecting whole categories of state-based
litigation into the federal forum must be placed in a broader context—
the context of the increasing anti-plaintiff impact of federal procedural
principles across the board. What has happened with mass accident torts
and what may happen to state-based class actions are just extreme
examples of a more insidious process—the steady erosion of state
substantive law through federal procedure even in normal diversity
cases. Perhaps the most significant procedural benefit offered by the
federal forum is the substantially greater possibility a defendant will win
on summary judgment when a case is situated in the federal courts.
In general, the rationale for summary judgment is to eliminate
controversies that are not trialworthy. Where the material facts are not
in dispute, so that the trier of fact need not decide them, a summary
procedure for determining the outcome is appropriate and does not
violate the right to jury trial.274 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
which provides for summary judgment in the federal courts, was part of
the original package of federal rules enacted in 1938.275 The 1963
amendments to Rule 56 theoretically increased the burden on parties
opposing summary judgment because it prohibited the nonmoving party
from relying on the pleadings alone, and required the nonmovant instead
to muster evidence beyond the pleadings gleaned from discovery or
opposing affidavits.276 If this burden is not met, then summary judgment
“shall be rendered forthwith.”277 The 1963 change raised a number of
questions—what showing the moving party would have to make to shift
the burden of production, how burdens of proof should affect summary
judgment, and what standards a court should use in evaluating evidence

272. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 35.
273. Id.
274. See Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE
L. J. 745, 747 (1974) (exploring the principal function of the motion for summary judgment).
275. See Georgene M. Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment After the Trilogies, in
Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts, SH063 ALI-ABA 577, 583
(2003) [hereinafter Vairo, Trilogies].
276. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
277. Id.
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mustered by the nonmovant to avoid summary judgment. It is also
important for understanding the dynamics to note that materials in
affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that
would be admissible at trial;278 thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
particularly the hearsay doctrine, can come into play when determining
whether a nonmovant has met the burden of producing new materials
showing that the case is trialworthy.
The requirements imposed by Rule 56(c) for successfully opposing
a motion for summary judgment fall more heavily on plaintiffs because
they typically bear the burden of proof.279 Moreover, there are particular
kinds of cases where fulfilling the mandate of 56(c) can be difficult,
even when the plaintiff’s claim has merit. For instance, where a case is
based on circumstantial evidence and no eyewitnesses are available, it is
challenging for plaintiffs to oppose summary judgment. When potential
witnesses do not cooperate to provide nonhearsay affidavits, the
evidence needed to oppose a motion can be difficult to obtain.280 In
products liability cases, one key piece of establishing liability is product
identification—the plaintiff must show that it is the particular
defendant’s product that has injured her. If the defendant controls access
to the information needed for product identification, and the defendant is
not forthcoming in discovery, the plaintiff may be unable to get to
evidence to oppose the motion.281 In less sinister circumstances, where
records and memories have diminished with time, the one with the
burden of producing them will inevitably lose on summary judgment.282
Finally, when the theory of liability depends for causation on difficult
inferences from statistical information, increasing hostility in the federal
courts to so called “junk science”283 may make it impossible for a
plaintiff to survive a defense motion for summary judgment.
278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).
279. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 81 (1990) [hereinafter Issacharoff & Loewenstein, Second Thoughts].
280. This may have been a reason why the plaintiff in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
142, 159-61 (1970), an early civil rights case concerned with desegregation of a lunch counter,
found it difficult to provide standard counter-affidavits.
281. In this context, consider the stance of the defendants. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, A
Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 63, 99 n. 231 (2003) (recalling the evidentiary stonewalling on the part of the
tobacco industry in the Minnesota tobacco litigation).
282. This was a key problem in Celotex itself. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986).
283. Daniel Riesel, Scientific Proof and Examination of Experts in Environmental Litigation,
SH093 ALI-ABA 383, 415 (2003) (analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the
admission of expert testimony) [hereinafter Riesel, Scientific Proof].
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In 1986 the United States Supreme Court decided three watershed
cases (sometimes referred to as the “trilogy”) governing summary
judgment practice in the federal courts. These cases made it much easier
for defendants to secure victory through the summary judgment
procedure.284 While it is standard doctrine that on summary judgment,
the trial court is not supposed to weigh evidence–a function reserved to
the trier of fact, the Supreme Court eroded that principle though its
holding in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.285 There the Court stated
that, “[a] ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily
implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply
at the trial on the merits.”286 Because the cause of action at issue there
required the plaintiff to establish that the defendant acted with malice
under the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, a trial court would
be authorized to grant summary judgment if, in its opinion, the counteraffidavits of the plaintiff did not rise to the level of evidence required.287
Matsushita Electric Industries, Co. v. Zenith Radio288 further obscured
the proper role of the trial judge when assessing the effectiveness of a
plaintiff’s counterevidence, for it introduced the wild card of motive.
There the Supreme Court argued that summary judgment was improper,
because it believed the defendant had no motive to do what the plaintiff
alleged: “[L]ack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions
that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence.”289 From the perspective
of the plaintiff’s fortunes on summary judgment in the federal forum,
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,290 has proved the most problematic, for when
read expansively, it obviates the necessity that a defendant who moves
284. As Georgene M. Vairo describes it:
During the Spring and Summer of 1986, the Supreme Court decided three summary
judgment cases: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett; and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. Unquestionably, these cases
had a significant impact on federal practice. In some respects, this trilogy represents a
radical departure from past summary judgment practice under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 (“Rule 56”). The decisions clearly advocate more liberal use of summary
judgment and thus provide a more hospitable climate for bringing summary judgment
motions.
Vairo, supra note 275, at 577 (citations omitted). But see generally Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on
Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV
770 (1988) (arguing that an increased willingness to dispense with cases on summary judgment
signaled by the trilogy is appropriate).
285. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
286. Id. at 252.
287. Id.
288. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
289. Id. at 596.
290. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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for judgment present any affirmative evidence that the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate a triable issue of fact. According to the Celotex plurality,291
it is enough that the defendant merely points out—albeit by referring to
pleadings, discovery, and other materials—that the plaintiff cannot
establish an element of a claim. Thus, the defendant need not provide
affidavits in support of its motion to shift the burden to the nonmoving
party. In cases where access to evidence is difficult because it is
circumstantial, witnesses are reluctant, the defendant controls it,
significant time has passed, or statistical proof is controversial, federal
courts are prone to grant summary judgment.
The principles of Anderson, Matsushita, and Celotex, though
couched in the language of procedure, have a definite and substantive
policy impact. Overall they tend to prevent plaintiffs in certain kinds of
cases, often tort actions based on state law, from getting to a jury to
prove liability.292 It is possible that numerous defendants who should be
liable to these plaintiffs are not held to be, given the procedural barriers
imposed by the federal version of summary judgment. Most importantly
for state-federal relations and the Erie doctrine, the net result is to make
it much more likely that a defendant in federal court will obtain
summary judgment than a defendant in state court. This becomes a
powerful motive for defendant forum-shopping and another reason why
tort reformers want to redirect tort litigation to the federal forum. Why
should this be the case? Because many states, fully cognizant of the
policy implications of Anderson, Matsushita, and Celotex, do not follow
them.
For instance, state court decisions in California,293 Indiana,294
Kentucky,295 Florida,296 Oklahoma,297 Oregon,298 and Texas299 repudiate
291. Id. at 322-23. Although Celotex was a plurality opinion, its gravitational pull has
decidedly changed the burdens previously allocated on summary judgment. See Issacharoff &
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts, supra note 279, at 79-84.
292. Jeffrey W. Stempel argues that their net result is to change the relative power of the
litigants in the federal courts. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s
Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 95, 159-62 (1988).
293. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(observing that “[u]nder the practice prevailing in the federal district courts since 1986, a defendant
moving for summary judgment is not required to present any evidence in support of the motion. . . .
a like rule does not appear ever to have prevailed under the California summary judgment statute”),
review denied, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 5986 (Cal. 2001).
294. Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994) (observing that
“Indiana’s summary judgment procedure abruptly diverges from federal summary judgment
practice. Under the federal rule, the party seeking summary judgment is not required to negate an
opponent’s claim. . . . Indiana does not adhere to Celotex and the federal methodology”).
295. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1991) (observing
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the holding in Celotex and require that before a defendant can shift the
burden of production to the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment, the
defendant must come forward with affirmative evidence of its own
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Moreover,
decisions in California,300 Georgia,301 Illinois,302 Ohio,303 and Rhode
Island304 have either distinguished or refused to extend Celotex.
Similarly, Alaska,305 Florida,306 Indiana,307 Kentucky,308 New Jersey,309
New Mexico,310 Oregon,311 Texas,312 and Wyoming313 decline to follow
Anderson, and opinions from Kentucky,314 Michigan,315 and Oregon316
disapprove of Matsushita. Collectively, these variations establish an
approach to summary judgment in state jurisdictions that is significantly
different from the federal approach. And, the ability to obtain a higher
that Kentucky courts “generally have cited and followed the decision in Paintsville Hospital Co. v.
Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985), which set the standard for summary judgment in this state and is
a standard which is clearly at variance with those declared in [the trilogy]”).
296. 5G’s Car Sales, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Law Enforcement, 581 So. 2d 212, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that although the lower court’s “judgment was plainly erroneous under any
standard, including Celotex [and progeny], it should be emphasized that, to the extent that they tend
to loosen the restrictions on the use of summary judgment, these cases. . . . do not represent the law
of Florida on the issue”).
297. Kating v. City of Prior, 977 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (observing that “the
federal summary judgment standards established in Celotex—a case cited by City—and other
related federal cases are not specifically applicable in Oklahoma appellate review of summary
judgments”).
298. Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 P.2d 608, 615-17 (Or. 1997) (rejecting the argument that
Celotex and progeny should affect the interpretation of Oregon’s summary judgment statute).
299. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989) (observing that “summary
judgments in federal courts are based on different assumptions, with different purposes, than
summary judgments in Texas. . . . Texas law, of course, is different. While the language of our rule
is similar [to the federal summary judgment rule], our interpretation of that language is not”).
300. Union Bank v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal. App. 4th 573, 590-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
301. First Nat’l Bank v. J. Reisbaum Co., 378 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
302. Ganci v. Washington, 745 N.E.2d 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
303. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 526 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio 1988).
304. DiBatista v. State, 808 A.2d 1081, 1090 (R.I. 2002).
305. Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 942-44 (Alaska 1988).
306. 5G’s Car Sales, Inc., 581 So. 2d at 212.
307. Chester v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
308. Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d at 479.
309. DePrimo v. Lehn & Fink Products Co., 538 A.2d 461, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987).
310. Bartlett v. Mirabal, 999 P.2d 1062 (N.M. App. 2000).
311. Jones, 939 P.2d at 615.
312. Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 555-56.
313. Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372, 376-77 (Wyo. 1988).
314. Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d at 479.
315. People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. 2003).
316. Jones, 939 P.2d at 615.
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incidence of victories on summary judgment in one system will have an
indirect impact on substantive policy choices concerning tort liability in
another. Just using one state jurisdiction—Oregon—is instructive. It
rejects all three decisions in the federal trilogy, so that a defendant
moving for summary judgment cannot carry its burden of production
without affirmative evidence (Celotex), burdens of proof do not raise the
risk that judges will improperly weigh the sufficiency of evidence on
summary judgment (Anderson), and plaintiff affidavits are not
discounted by way of the elusive standard of defendant motive
(Matsushita). Presumably, it is more difficult to keep a case from the
jury in Oregon state proceedings. Yet if a cause of action based on
Oregon law can be redirected to the federal forum, it is possible that the
defendant’s chances of achieving summary judgment increase
significantly. Being merely “procedural,” the tenets of Celotex,
Anderson, and Matsushita trump Oregon state practice, and we are
invited to ignore the impact they might have on the policy choices made
by Oregon political majorities concerning tort liability. When this
possibility is related to the democratic principles of participation,
transparency, and accountability, the stakes involved in enlarging
diversity jurisdiction are uncovered.
C. Summary Judgment Substitutes
The difference in summary judgment between the state and federal
systems is not difficult to detect; however, federal courts are developing
additional procedures that are functional equivalents of summary
judgment, but of a more stealthy kind. Again, procedural innovation is
being deployed to manufacture particular outcomes, but in an attenuated
fashion that further insulates what is happening from the attention of
democratic majorities by another layer of process. These procedures can
be conceived as “summary judgment substitutes”317 and the best
example of the phenomenon is the “Daubert hearing,” under which a
litigant’s potential to rely on expert testimony to stave off summary
judgment can be foreclosed in advance. Again, given burdens of proof,
this procedure typically functions to disadvantage plaintiffs, not
defendants, and it does so especially in cases where the plaintiff needs to
use statistical inference via expert opinion to establish causation.
To place Daubert hearings in context, it is important to remember
that the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) govern in all cases located in
317. The concept of “summary judgment substitutes” is attributable to my colleague Ivan
Bodensteiner who suggested the idea to me in conversation about this article.
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the federal forum, whether those cases are based on state law or not.318
Another way of putting this is that the FRE generally have the same
status as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the Erie/Hanna
regime—they are treated as rules of procedure not substance, so that
they control over conflicting state evidence rules. In 1993 the Supreme
Court ushered in a new era regarding the use of expert scientific
evidence with its opinion, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.319 Daubert increased the power of federal trial judges to exclude
relevant expert testimony by investing them with a “gatekeeper”
function to determine when proffered scientific proof was not reliable
enough to be considered by the trier of fact, usually a jury.320 Rather
than directing the jury to consider expert testimony and allowing it to
measure reliability to determine evidentiary weight, Daubert allows the
trial judge to exclude the material altogether.321 The trial judge’s
determination is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard.322 It did not take long for defendants to waken to the potential
impact of Daubert on summary judgment.
Where liability in a proceeding turns on the opinions of conflicting
experts, summary judgment would normally be precluded as a defense
option because the very conflict in the experts’ opinions would present a
triable issue of fact for a jury to resolve. However, if the plaintiff’s
experts’ opinions can be excluded, this removes a lynchpin source the
plaintiff can use to oppose summary judgment. The purpose of the
Daubert hearing is to attack the admissibility of expert evidence in
advance of trial and strategically position a party—usually the
defendant—to move for summary judgment.
It has become
commonplace for federal courts to conduct a “Daubert hearing” to test
the admissibility of plaintiffs’ crucial expert opinions early on in
litigation;323 when the evidence is ruled inadmissible—a frequent
phenomenon—a successful defense motion for summary judgment
318. This was actually quite controversial in regard to evidentiary privileges. See Ely, Myth,
supra note 85, at 693-96.
319. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In fact, FRE 702 was amended to conform with Daubert. See FED.
R. EVID. 702 (establishing the preconditions for admissibility of expert testimony). Companion
cases extending and refining the basic principle of Daubert are General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 138 (1997) (establishing abuse of discretion as the standard of review) and Kumho Tire
Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending Daubert to all expert testimony).
320. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-593.
321. See Development in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1488-89 (1995). See also Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412,
417 (3d Cir. 1999).
322. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39.
323. See Riesel, Scientific Proof, supra note 283, at 411.
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typically follows.324 As one commentator has noted, the application of
Daubert325 “has resulted in the exclusion of many more experts than it
has admitted.”
As with the rules in Anderson, Celotex, and Matsushita, a
substantial number of states do not follow Daubert. Cases from
Alabama,326 Arizona,327 California,328 Colorado,329 Georgia,330 Florida,331
Illinois,332 Kansas,333 Michigan,334 Mississippi,335 Missouri,336
Minnesota,337 New Jersey,338 New York,339 Nevada,340 South Carolina,341
Tennessee, 342 Washington,343and Wisconsin344 have repudiated Daubert
or limited its application. The reasons for their reluctance are complex
and involve not only policy considerations involving civil matters, but
criminal ones as well. In regard to civil cases, the Arizona Supreme
Court stated concerning Daubert and its progeny:
One of the arguments for adopting Daubert is to allow trial judges to
put a halt to improper verdicts from jurors misled by junk science and
experts ready at the drop of a hat (or a dollar) to say anything for any
party. This, of course, a two-edged sword—plaintiffs’ lawyers do not
have a monopoly on venal or inaccurate experts. But we do not
believe that Daubert/Kumho to be a perfect or even a good antidote.
Implicit in Joiner and Kumho is the assumption that trial judges as a
324. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1104 n.623 (2003) [hereinafter Miller].
325. See Reisel, supra note 283, at 420, 420 n. 29.
326. Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. v. Long, 779 So. 2d 198, 202 (Ala. 2000) (holding that Alabama
courts have not “abandoned the ‘general acceptance’ test stated in [Frye], and it has not adopted the
Daubert standard in civil cases”).
327. Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 124-33 (Ariz. 2000).
328. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 337 (Cal. 1994).
329. Lindsay v. People, 892 P.2d 281, 288 (Colo. 1995), overruled by People v. Shreck, 22
P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001) .
330. Norfolk S. Ry. v. Baker, 514 S.E.2d 448, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
331. Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003).
332. People v. Dalcallo, 669 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
333. Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 929 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
334. Lacasse v. Lacasse, No. 207639, 1998 WL 1988763 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1998).
335. Watkins v. U-Haul Intern, Inc., 770 So. 2d 970, 974 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
336. Bailey v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 122 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
337. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
338. State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 340-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
339. People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454-55 (N.Y. 1994).
340. Krause, Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 566, 569 (Nev. 2001).
341. Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 534 S.E.2d 672, 677-78 (S.C. 2000).
342. Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 226-30 (Tenn. 2000).
343. State v. Cannon, 922 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Wash. 1996).
344. Anderson v. Combustion Eng’g Inc., 647 N.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
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group will be more able than jurors to tell good science from junk, true
scientists from charlatans, truthful experts from liars, and venal from
objective experts. But most judges like most jurors, have little or no
technical training . . . .345

From the perspective of the Arizona Supreme Court, whether or not to
adopt Daubert and its companion cases represented a definite policy
choice concerning its effect on plaintiffs and juries. But, if the same
controversy were funneled to the federal court, Daubert would be
applicable and the availability of a pre-summary judgment, pre-trial
hearing designed to remove the plaintiff’s experts would be available. It
is not surprising that many commentators conclude the outcome of a
Daubert hearing determines the outcome of a case.346 The analysis
comes full circle when the impact of Daubert hearings is related back to
the continuing trend of considering the merits on class certification.
When a defendant succeeds in removing a state-based class action to the
federal court, either under normal principles or the floodgate to be
opened by the CAFA, the defendant will have a high probability of
achieving the effect of summary judgment through a strategic use of
class certification in conjunction with Daubert considerations.
According to commentators, an increasing number of federal courts
apply Daubert to the question of whether a class action should be
certified, as parties utilize experts in aid of the class action
determination.347 So far the results have been uneven. For instance, in
Sanneman v. Chrysler Corporation348 a Daubert-style inquiry resulted in
the plaintiff classes’ failure to satisfy the predominance test required by
23(b)(3), because the experts could not agree on the causes of the
complained damages.349 On the other hand, in McNamara v. Re-X
Minerals Ltd350 the court concluded the defendant had not succeeded in
showing that the plaintiff classes’ expert was unreliable. These cases
cabined the Daubert inquiry from merits considerations. Whether this
distinction can long be maintained given the trend established by RhonePoulenc Rorer351 and the invitation of amended Rule 23 to use the fruits
of merits-based discovery is an open question. It is not hard to imagine
345. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 129 (footnote omitted).
346. See Miller, supra note 324, at 1104 n.623.
347. See Steven Glickstein, Melissa C. Morrow, and Julie K. du Pont, Does Daubert Apply to
Class Certification Hearings?, 695 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES 423, 425 (2003).
348. 191 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
349. Id. at 451-53.
350. No. 5:97-CV-159, 2002 WL 32076175 (E.D. Tex. June 16, 2002).
351. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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that as more mass tort class actions involving, for instance, defective
pharmaceuticals, are drawn into the federal system, the very same
arguments about junk science from Daubert will be mustered to oppose
class certification, thereby combining summary judgment substitutes–the
Daubert hearing and the denial of class certification—to curtail the
litigation altogether.
D. Other Benefits
A more demanding process of class certification, a greater
probability of achieving summary judgment, and the opportunity to
exploit summary judgment substitutes are not the only procedural
features that entice defendants to the federal forum in hopes of ensuring
victory there. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and important
decisions construing them provide a global and rich package of
defendant-oriented devices that frequently displace important state
policies. No less an authority than Arthur Miller has warned that federal
case management under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the
adoption of law and economics doctrine by certain federal circuits, and
standards for judgments as a matter of law, as well as summary
judgment and Daubert trials, are causing a “rush to judgment” that
obviates the plaintiff’s right to a day in court and the role of juries.352 In
the context of the MPMFJA and the CAFA, these concerns play out in a
more complicated dance whose consequences are even farther removed
from public scrutiny.
The strategy of this legislation is to create a Catch-22, or a kind of
black-hole singularity for state mass torts, especially mass tort class
actions. First, state-based claims that never could have been brought
into the federal forum are redirected there through the device of minimal
diversity. Once there, they are subjected to the tender mercies of the
MDL process and/or the CAFA, and amended Rule 23 as it informs
both. In the case of the CAFA the goal is to abort class action
certification—unless a binding global class settlement is desired—and
subject plaintiffs to the Hobson’s choice of either proceeding to litigate
their claims in state court as individual matters, which, given a particular
plaintiff’s knowledge or other resources may not be likely, or to merely
“lump it” and cease litigating altogether. Beyond the effect that
federalization has on particular proceedings, it has a more problematic
general one–the chilling effect it will cast on the willingness of lawyers

352. See Miller, supra note 324, passim.
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to represent plaintiffs. The specter of having state-based litigation
drawn into the federal forum at the defendant’s will and time table,
where attorney autonomy is curtailed and the defendant-oriented
principles of class certification, summary judgment, and summary
judgment substitutes are applied, will inhibit lawyers’ willingness to
represent plaintiffs in mass class action torts. It is the goal of CAFA that
these actions be tied up in the push-pull of the system and that lawyers
will recognize this. Meanwhile the ability of states to enforce their own
policy choices on tort liability will have been limited by a process that
never was opened to democratic deliberation over the substantive
changes in law that were at stake.
V. SUMMARY—DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED
In his 1989 article, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules
Enabling Act,353 Paul Carrington used a test for “substance,” that
suggests when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure might unduly affect
state law, i.e., whether it provokes the “organized political attention of a
group of litigants or prospective litigants who (reasonably) claim to be
specially and adversely affected by the rule.”354 When this test is
applied not only to the federal rules themselves but to federal procedural
statutes, it is clear that the CAFA, possibly the MPMFJA, and their
related procedural assumptions, appendages, and extensions flunk this
test of political interest. The proponents of enlarging diversity
jurisdiction do so for the avowed purpose of changing the substantive
results of complex litigation emanating from the states. They are
organized and political and they represent a group of litigants—
defendants—who hope to be specially affected by the new procedural
regime, though positively, not adversely. What price does ignoring this
reality extract in terms of democratic values?
First, it makes a mockery of retaining the states as essential
building blocks of political community and participation at the local
level. If a group of defendants with national power can extend minimal
diversity to any case they deem “interstate,” there is no principled limit
to the reach of the federal judiciary. By spinning the history, purpose,
and effect of diversity jurisdiction in the constitutional framework, these
interest groups subtly reorder the structure of the Constitution outside
353. See Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 281, 308 (1989). For Carrington’s general account of the significance of 28 U.S.C. §
2072(b), see id. at 286-89.
354. Id. at 308.
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the purview of the amendment process. But relocating more complex
litigation to the federal courts has costs beyond the direct changes in
federal/state relations. It erodes key constituents of democratic
legitimacy, for democracy is not just transported to a different arena
without residue. Instead, because the method of affecting substance
through procedure is technocratic, indirect, and frequently judge-made,
it retards citizen participation in the value choices the method
effectuates; it replaces transparency in lawmaking with opacity, and it
makes political decisionmaking too diffuse to enforce meaningful
accountability. What might the quality of policy decisions made through
these attenuated and indirect methods be?
Creating a regime of complex litigation designed to crudely reduce
the amount of money paid by repeat defendants across the board will
cause negative externalities. The true social cost of risky behavior will
not be paid. What is more important, the opportunity to make difficult
value choices as to the worth of defendant behavior will be removed
from local democratic majorities, and it will not be replaced with access
by national political majorities. This is because tort law is being
remodeled by the stealthy method of employing procedural change, not
by substantive legislation that would be exposed to greater political
scrutiny and would have to pass the test of valid substantive legislation
under Article I. Another way of saying this is that by exploiting the
judicial power of the national government in diversity cases, proponents
of tort reform have made it exceedingly difficult for the average citizen
to identify changes in law that will affect her everyday relations and to
efficiently mobilize political opposition to them. For instance, how does
the normal state citizen understand and oppose something like class
action certification under amended Rule 23 when they are produced by a
process as complex and obscure as federal rulemaking?
It is a truism of federal law that a uniform body of procedural
principles governing the conduct of the federal courts is highly desirable.
But, the principle of uniformity is not so sacrosanct that it should
become the means by which an era of Swift v. Tyson is reinstituted to the
detriment of democratic values. The effect of CAFA on state substance
could be so significant that Congress has gone beyond any legitimate use
of the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with its power to
establish the inferior federal courts.355 When minimal diversity is
deployed for the very purpose of subverting the law of the states, it
should be rejected as fundamentally incompatible with the structure of
355. See Baker, supra note 38, at 711.
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the United States Constitution and the democratic principles to which we
aspire.
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